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Introduction 
 
 
Climate change has emerged as one of the great global challenges that we are confronted with. 
During the writing of this thesis, a series of events have brought the issue to a new status in the way 
it is perceived by the society as a whole. Scientific contribution to the understanding of the natural 
processes governing climate change and of consequent socio-economic impacts has attracted an 
increasing attention from the public, culminating in the recognition of the Peace Nobel Prize in 
20071. In parallel to this growing consensus over the scientific basis for climate change, the climate 
challenge has become a public policy priority, and is now ranking high in the political agenda of 
many countries. No longer treated as an environmental issue alone, it is often directly dealt by head 
of states, who gave it top priority in G8 meetings such as the 2007 one2, and commissioned and 
helped disseminating dedicated reports such as the Stern Review3. 
One might wonder what are the reasons behind this momentum, despite the many uncertainties and 
unresolved issues that characterize the global warming phenomenon. A likely candidate answer is 
the all-embracing nature of the problem. Climate change ranges widely into many directions: it 
involves different generations across time and space, with varied socio-economic and natural 
ecosystem impacts, most of which are unknown or hardly quantifiable. Its solution requires a 
coordinated effort of unprecedented scale, engaging many economic and natural activities and 
calling for a new role of the public sector. And it naturally raises distributional and legacy issues 
confronting developed and developing worlds. 
From a research stand point, the diverse nature of the problem is a challenge as it is a motivation. 
Economists can offer important insights on the implications of both limiting and confronting the 
problem, thus offering fundamental guidance to the policy makers involved in the complex 
negotiation processes. But in order to do so, they need to draw from a series of traditional economic 
tools -e.g. public economics, economic growth, development economics, environmental economics, 
analysis under uncertainty- as well as from other fields, notably energy and natural systems 
analysis. 
With all such stimulus, a growing numbers of scholars have contributed to climate change 
economics research in the past few years, ranging from theoretical to empirical work, aimed at 
different stakeholders. The work carried out in this Thesis aims at contributing to this young and 
                                                 
1
 The prize was assigned to Al Gore and the IPCC for “their efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge 
about man-made climate change, and to lay the foundations for the measures that are needed to counteract such 
change”. 
2
 http://www.g-8.de/nn_94646/Content/EN/Artikel/__g8-summit/2007-06-07-g8-klimaschutz__en.html 
3
 http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/sternreview_index.cfm  
thought-provoking literature by providing an extensive economic evaluation of the strategies 
needed to cope with climate protection. 
 
 
Scope of the thesis 
 
 
The work collected in this Thesis is an attempt at a better understanding of the economic 
implications of climate mitigation policies. The starting point assumed here is that global warming 
is dangerous and societies are committed to climate protection policies. The final objective is to 
inform on the socio-economic costs required to comply with the envisioned climate goals, and to 
provide with a set of strategies that would allow to achieve it in an economically efficient way.  
This ambitious workplan requires a rigorous methodology that can deal with the complex nature of 
the problem. The main approach followed here is the one of numerical modelling of economy-
energy-climate interactions, though some analytical insight is also provided. Models of this kind are 
particularly suited for applications in this research area, as they can reconcile aspects of economic 
analysis with energy and climate planning. Despite their recent development, integrated assessment 
models are now used widely in the analysis of climate change, so that for example they constitute 
an important part of IPCC reports.  
The model WITCH developed and used in this work belongs to this strand of literature, but 
introduces a series of novelties that place it in the position to capture additional aspects of the 
problem at stake. It features a neo-classical optimal growth structure so that the very long term 
nature of climate change is accounted via inter-temporal optimization, and far-sighted economic 
agents can incorporate long term effects into current decisions. Strategies are thus time efficient, an 
important characteristic given that CO2 molecules stay in the atmosphere for hundreds of years, and 
investments in the energy sector can last for several decades4, and thus todays decisions are 
important determinants of future responses. The energy sector, the largest responsible of greenhouse 
gas emissions, is accounted for in the model by a full integration into the economic production 
function, an “hard link” that ensures consistency of the economic output and the investments 
decisions in the main energy carriers. Technological change is portrayed via both diffusion and 
innovation processes, and policy induced innovation is thus accounted for. Last but not least, the 
model has one of its most important characteristics in the game theoretical set up that allows to 
mimic the free-riding incentives that the 12 regions that constitute the world are confronted with as 
a result of public goods or bads. Global externalities due to CO2, but also to extraction of 
exhaustible resources such as fossil fuels, and to limited appropriability of knowledge behind 
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 The half time of a molecule of CO2 is roughly 100 years. Power plants lifetimes can surpass half century. 
innovation, are taken into account so that regions choose their investment paths strategically with 
respect to other regions choices. 
The result is a hybrid model that can provide normative analysis about climate protection policies 
and that can be used to inform policymakers on the economic efficient set of policies needed to 
combat global warming but also to deal with additionally related environmental and economic 
inefficiencies. 
 
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
 
The thesis is structures around three papers and an Appendix. Each paper deals with a crucial aspect 
of climate mitigation policies, namely technologies and innovation, technology uncertainty and 
natural systems. The appendix provides a reference to the methodology employed. The analysis of 
investments in current and future energy technologies for climate change mitigation carried out in 
the first article is expanded in the second one by focusing on the role of uncertain innovation. The 
third paper adds the natural dimension by assessing the potential of forestry management in 
contributing to CO2 abatement. 
The general setting is one of cost effective analysis of climate stabilization policies. To single out 
the role of the aforementioned mitigation options, we assume complete participation of countries in 
a global perfect carbon market that ensures the equalization of marginal abatement costs across 
countries. 
 
Paper 1 “Optimal Investment and R&D Strategies to Stabilize Greenhouse Gas Atmospheric 
Concentrations”  
The first paper deals with cost-effective strategies that stabilize CO2 concentrations looking at the 
energy investment and R&D policies that optimally achieve GHG stabilization. Our results show 
that they are feasible, but require radical changes in the energy sector and large investments in 
R&D. Improvements in energy and carbon efficiency are shown to be essential, both via currently 
known technologies such as nuclear and renewables, but also via innovative ones for which large 
energy R&D programs are needed.  
 
Paper 2 “Uncertain R&D, backstop technology and GHG stabilization” 
The recognition of the role of knowledge as a way to decouple economic growth and climate 
protection is the motivation of this second paper, in which innovation strategies with uncertain 
effectiveness of R&D are evaluated. By means of both an analytical model and the numerical model 
WITCH, we show the implications of innovation uncertainty on the productivity of the investments 
and the overall economic performance of the climate policy. 
 
 
Paper 3 “Forestry and the carbon market response to stabilize climate” 
Although the energy sector is the main responsible of green house gas emissions, natural systems 
are also important determinants of emissions. Forestry for example, both via avoided deforestation 
and afforestation, has the potential to be a convenient mitigation alternative. Its role in the climate 
mitigation context is analysed in the third paper, where the WITCH model is coupled with a global 
timber model to assess the global responses of the carbon market to the inclusion of forestry 
activities into climate policies. 
 
Appendix. WITCH model description 
The Appendix provides an explanation of the main modelling tool used throughout the thesis. 
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concentrations at 550 or 450 ppm. Since technological change is endogenous and multifaceted in WITCH, 
and the energy sector is modeled in detail, we can provide a description of the ideal combination of 
technical progress and alternative energy investment paths in achieving the sought stabilization targets. 
Given that the model accounts for interdependencies and spillovers across 12 regions of the world, 
equilibrium strategies are the outcome of a dynamic game through which inefficiency costs induced by 
global strategic interactions can be assessed. Therefore, our results differ from previous analyses of GHG 
stabilization policies, where a central planner or a single global economy is usually assumed. Our results 
emphasize the drastic change in the energy mix that will be necessary to control climate change, the huge 
investments in existing and new technologies implied, and the crucial role of technological innovation. 
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 1. Introduction 
Climate change may dramatically damage future generations. According to the latest IPCC 
report (IPCC, 2007), anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) are among the main 
causes of climate change, even though uncertainty remains as to their exact relevance in the overall 
climatic process: thus it is necessary to identify when, where and how these emissions ought to be 
controlled in order to avoid dangerous climate changes.  
The many uncertainties that still permeate the debate about the relationship between GHG 
concentrations and temperature change or the existence of temperature thresholds beyond which 
irreversible changes could occur, make it difficult to use the standard cost-benefit framework for 
jointly identifying the optimal stabilization target and related investment mix. Scientific 
uncertainties aside, the long-term stabilization target is clearly a political decision, and 
policymakers worldwide are indeed discussing how to tackle the climate change problem. At the 
2008 G8 Summit in Japan, the leading industrialized nations agreed on the objective of at least 
halving global CO2 emissions by 2050. Such an agreement follows earlier resolutions of other 
countries, such as the EU, Canada and Japan.1 There is therefore increasing interest in, and a need 
for, research efforts providing information on the best strategy that different regions of the world 
should adopt in order to minimize the cost of achieving their own emission reduction target. In 
particular, it is crucial to identify the long-term investment mix in the energy sector in different 
world regions, taking into account the role of investments in energy R&D and the future evolution 
of different technologies. 
For analytical purposes, this paper considers two long-term stabilization targets, both expressed 
in terms of atmospheric carbon concentrations. The first target is a 550 ppm (CO2 only) 
concentration target. The second one stabilizes emissions at 450 ppm (CO2 only). These two 
reference targets roughly coincide with IPCC Post-TAR stabilization scenarios C and B 
respectively. Although the IPCC considers even more stringent emissions pathways, our current 
analysis focuses on the two that we consider more politically realistic. The first target is often 
advocated for in the US (see for example Newell and Hall, 2007), whereas the second one is close 
to the EU objective of keeping future temperature changes within 2 degrees Celsius. We then 
compute the welfare maximizing path of energy R&D expenditures, investments in energy 
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 The European Union, for example, has identified both its long term target (a temperature increase of less than 2 
degrees Celsius) and the short term target consistent with the former (i.e. a reduction of 2020 emissions by 20% with 
respect to 1990, which may become a 30% reduction if all countries jointly reduce their emissions in the same manner). 
technologies and direct consumption of fossil fuels that is consistent with the proposed 
stabilization targets.  
The equilibrium R&D and investment strategies in a given region of the world depend upon 
many factors, such as: the discount rate; the investment decisions taken in other regions or 
countries; and the effectiveness of R&D in increasing energy efficiency, or in providing new, low 
carbon, energy technologies. Equilibrium R&D and investment strategies also depend on the 
expected climate damages, on the pattern of economic growth in various regions of the world, and 
on other economic and demographic variables. In this paper, all these interdependent factors are 
taken into account. 
To this purpose, we use WITCH (Bosetti, Carraro, Galeotti, Massetti and Tavoni, 2006), a 
climate-energy-economy model in which a representation of the energy sector is fully integrated 
into a top-down optimization model of the world economy. Thus, the model yields the equilibrium 
intertemporal allocation of investments in energy technologies and R&D that belong to the best 
economic and technological responses to different policy measures. The game theory set-up 
accounts for interdependencies and spillovers across 12 regions of the world. Therefore, 
equilibrium strategies are the outcome of a dynamic game through which inefficiencies induced by 
global strategic interactions can be assessed. In WITCH, technological progress in the energy 
sector is endogenous, thus enabling us to account for the effects of different stabilization scenarios 
on induced technical change, via both innovation and diffusion processes. Feedback from 
economic variables to climatic ones, and vice versa, is also accounted for in the dynamic system. 
These features enable WITCH to address many questions that naturally arise when analyzing 
carbon mitigation policies. Among those that this paper aims to answer are the following: what are 
the implications of the proposed stabilization targets for investment strategies and consumption of 
traditional energy sources vis-a-vis low carbon options?; what is the role of public energy R&D 
expenditures for generating improvements in both energy efficiency and carbon intensity?; and 
how sensitive are the economic costs of climate policies to different technological scenarios, and in 
particular, to hypotheses on major technological breakthroughs? 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the framework of our analysis and 
explores the implications of stabilization targets for the energy sector. Section 3 informs readers 
about investment needs for known technologies, while Section 4 focuses on innovation strategies. 
Section 5 provides estimates of the economic costs of climate policy with a focus on technological 
choices, and Section 6 concludes the paper. The Appendix provides background information on the 
WITCH model. 
2. The Challenge of Stabilizing Atmospheric GHG Concentrations. 
As previously indicated, we investigate best response strategies, particularly in the energy sector, 
to achieve two stabilization targets. According to the first one, atmospheric concentrations must be 
stabilized at 550 ppm (CO2 only) by the end of the century. This is roughly equivalent to a 650 
ppm target if all GHGs are included. The second target is more stringent and requires that CO2 
concentrations be stabilized at 450 ppm (550 ppm all gases included) at the end of the century. 
Figure 1 shows Business as Usual (BaU) emissions together with emission time profiles for the 
two stabilization targets. These are optimal time profiles because they were obtained by computing 
the fully cooperative equilibrium of the game given the GHG concentration constraints, i.e. by 
solving aglobal joint welfare maximization problem where all externalities are internalized. Note 
that feedbacks from climate damage to the production of economic goods2 are taken into account 
when computing the optimal emission profiles. 
Figure 1. World fossil fuel emissions in the three scenarios (2002-2102). 
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Current annual fossil fuel CO2 emissions are roughly 7 GtC/yr. According to the model 
projections, without any stabilization policy (the BaU or “baseline” scenario), CO2 emissions are 
expected to reach about 21 GtC by the end of the century, a value in line with the IPCC B2 SRES 
scenario. In the case of the 550 ppm stabilization target, annual emissions slowly increase until 
2060 (when they reach 10 GtC per year) and then decrease to 8 GtC by the end of the century. If 
the target is 450 ppm, CO2 emissions start decreasing immediately and reach 3GtC by the end of 
the century. That is, the optimal emission profile does not allow for overshooting emissions which 
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 We adopt the same damage function as in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). Future damages are discounted at a declining 
discount rate (starting from 3% and declining to 2%). 
would trade off current and future abatement. The emission reductions required to meet the more 
stringent stabilization target are particularly challenging, given the expected growth rate of world 
population and GDP: per capita emissions in the second part of this century would have to decline 
from about 2 to 0.3 tC/cap per year3.  
To achieve the two stabilization targets and the related optimal emission profile, it is assumed 
that all regions of the world agree on implementing a cap and trade policy. This is an obvious 
simplification which is useful in this paper to focus on differences in the technological make-up of 
the economy under the two stabilization scenarios, and on the difference in R&D portfolios. In two 
companion papers (Bosetti, et al., 2008a,b), we analysed the implications of partial agreements, 
delayed action in developing countries, and uncertain stabilization targets. In this paper, the global 
cap and trade policy is implemented by assuming an equal per capita allocation of initial 
allowances. 
Given the adopted climate policy, countries use the permit market to trade emissions (banking 
is also allowed) and determine their investments and R&D strategies, as well as their demand for 
permits, by maximizing their own welfare function (see the Appendix) given the strategy adopted 
in the other regions of the world. The intertemporal Nash equilibrium of the dynamic game defines 
the equilibrium investment strategies in each world region.   
To assess the implications of the equilibrium of the game under the two concentration 
constraints, let us compare the impact of imposing the two stabilization targets on the dynamics of 
the main economic variables. Table 1 shows the changes in the variables belonging to the well-
known Kaya’s identity (emissions, per capita GDP, energy intensity, carbon intensity of energy 
and population) for two periods: 1972-2002 (historical values) and 2002-2032 (WITCH scenarios). 
In the BaU, future changes of all economic variables are close to those observed in the past 
thirty years. Baseline emissions almost double in 30 years time, due to increasing population and 
improving lifestyles. This increase is partially compensated by looser economy-energy 
interdependence, but not by an energy-carbon decoupling. The characteristics of the baseline have 
important implications in terms of efforts required to stabilize the climate (and therefore in terms 
of stabilization costs). In this respect, the reproduction of history – at least over short time horizons 
– provides a useful benchmark.  
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 Note that 0.3 tC yr-1cap-1 is the amount of carbon emitted on a one way flight from the EU to the US East Coast. 
 Table 1. Ratio of future over past values of Kaya’ s variables in the three scenarios 
      (BAU, 450 ppm and 550 ppm). 
 
WORLD 
      
2032 vs 2002 ∆ EMI ∆ GDP/POP ∆ EN/GDP ∆ EMI/EN ∆ POP 
BAU 1.94 1.92 0.74 1.04 1.31 
550 1.28 1.91 0.61 0.84 1.31 
450 0.86 1.89 0.49 0.70 1.31 
      
2002 vs 1972 ∆ EMI ∆ GDP/POP ∆ EN/GDP ∆ EMI/EN ∆ POP 
Historical 1.96 1.64 0.76 0.97 1.63 
 
In the 550 ppm scenario, lesser growth in emissions stems mainly from energy efficiency 
improvements as testified by the decrease of energy intensity (∆ EN/GDP column), although some 
de-carbonization of energy is also needed. A more fundamental change is required in the 450 ppm 
scenario. Keeping carbon concentrations below this target can be achieved only if both energy 
intensity and carbon content of energy are significantly decreased. 
Figure 2 provides some additional interesting information on the modifications required in the 
energy sector, as it plots the evolution of energy intensity and carbon intensity of energy in 2030, 
2050 and 2100. The BaU scenario is characterized by an improvement of energy intensity, even 
though slightly less pronounced than the historical one. It also shows a slight carbonization of 
energy over the century: although small, this effect reflects the increasing share of coal in the 
energy mix in the absence of climate policy (this is also consistent with the Energy Information 
Agency’s medium term projections; see EIA, 2007). This increase is mostly driven by the growing 
energy consumption of developing countries. Coming to the stabilization scenarios, they both 
show energy efficiency measures to be the most relevant in the short-term, but both call for the 
development of low carbon options in the long-term, especially for the more stringent 450 
stabilization target. 
The dynamic paths of energy intensity and carbon intensity of energy implied by the two 
stabilization scenarios require drastic changes in the energy sector. The next section will analyze 
the equilibrium investment paths in different energy technologies over the next century. This will 
allow us to identify the welfare maximizing investment strategies that different regions of the 
world ought to implement to achieve the two stabilization targets. 
 
 Figure 2. Reductions of energy and carbon intensity in the next 30, 50 and 100 years, and 
          over the past 30 years (changes w.r.t 2002) 
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4. Equilibrium Mitigation Strategies with Known Energy Technologies. 
The energy sector is characterized by long-lived capital. Therefore the investment strategies 
pursued in the next two/three decades will be crucial in determining the emissions pathways that 
will eventually emerge in the second half of the century. The previous section highlighted the 
urgent need for a new strategy in the energy sector, targeted to de-carbonize energy production. 
This can be done through the extensive deployment of currently known abatement technologies 
(Pacala and Socolow, 2004) and/or through the development of new energy technologies. Let us 
analyze the equilibrium investment mix and the related shares of existing and innovative 
technologies in the stabilization investment portfolio.  
Emission reductions can be achieved by increasing energy efficiency and by reducing carbon 
intensity. As shown in Figure 2, energy efficiency improvements beyond the baseline scenario are 
the first essential option to endorse. Many economic sectors are characterized by the potential for 
large savings at relatively low costs. Yet, especially for ambitious emission reductions, energy 
efficiency improvements are not enough and energy de-carbonization is essential. Supply cost 
curves of abatement vary widely across sectors; for example they are believed to be especially 
steep in the transport sector. Power generation is comparatively more promising: it is a heavy 
weight sector in terms of emissions and one of the few for which alternative production 
technologies are available.  
Not surprisingly, our scenarios show a significant contribution of electricity in mitigation, as 
illustrated by Figure 3. To optimally achieve a 450 ppm concentration target, almost all electricity 
(around 90%) will have to be generated at low, almost zero, carbon rates by 2050 (left panel). The 
milder 550 target allows a more gradual transition away from fossil fuel based electricity, but 
nonetheless shows a noticeable departure from the no climate policy BAU scenario. The role of 
electricity is strengthened by its growing share with respect to primary energy supply. The 
substitution towards electricity is especially important for the more stringent 450 scenario (Figure 
3, right panel), since it makes it possible to meet the strong emissions cuts needed in the traditional 
non-electric sector. Such a radical change is achieved through three already operational 
technologies4: nuclear energy, renewable sources (wind & solar) and carbon capture and 
sequestration (CCS) (see Figure 4 that shows the power generation shares for the 550 (left) and 
450 (right) scenarios.). 
 
Figure 3. The role of electricity in mitigation 
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Nuclear power becomes extremely competitive given the range of carbon prices implicit in the 
adoption of climate policy, especially for the 450 case, where it eventually guarantees about 50% 
of total electricity generation. This remarkable expansion requires a 10-fold increase in present 
generation capacity. Twenty or more 1GigaWatt (GW) nuclear plants would need to be built each 
year in the next half century, bringing the nuclear industry back to the construction rates of the 
1980s. Clearly, this gigantic capacity deployment for such a contentious technology would raise 
significant social and environmental concerns, to the point that the feasibility of a nuclear-based 
scenario would ultimately rest on the capacity to radically innovate the technology itself, as well as 
on the institutions controlling its global use. 
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 Although for carbon capture and sequestration only pilot projects are in place at the present moment, the technology 
has been operating on a smaller scale for enhanced oil recovery for a long time now. 
Renewable energies, especially wind power, have developed at an impressive rate in recent 
years (up to 10GW per year), but the limited annual operating hours and costs bind their potential 
electricity contribution, at least in the short run. Only later in time would capacity additions reach 
30 GW per year - especially via solar power - and be able to significantly contribute to the de-
carbonization of the power sector. 
 
Figure 4. Power generation shares for the 550 (left) and 450 (right) scenarios. 
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Carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) makes it possible to burn coal in power plants while 
massively reducing carbon emissions. The decoupling of coal use and carbon emissions is 
particularly important for regions with a large endowment of coal reserves and because coal-fired 
power plants are very attractive for energy security reasons. However, the necessary investments 
are very large. To achieve the 550 ppm target, between 30 and 40 1GW coal-with-CCS power 
plants would need to be built each year from 2015 onwards, a value in line with the historical 
capacity building of traditional coal plants (roughly 50% of electricity generated in the world). A 
number of large-scale pilot plants should thus be put into place in the next ten years to ensure the 
feasibility of such a massive deployment.  
Figure 5 further elaborates on the role of CCS. The optimal amount of injected carbon is shown 
to be significant: about 2 GtC/yr (about 1/4 of today’s emissions) are stored underground by mid 
century. Over the whole century, about 150GtC are injected in underground deposits (a figure in 
line also with the IPCC 4AR WGIII). However, in the 450 scenario, the use of this technology 
decreases after 2050. The reason is that a more stringent target calls for a relatively greater 
deployment of very low carbon technologies; renewable energies and nuclear power are thus 
progressively preferred to CCS, because they have lower emission factors5. Advances in the 
capacity to capture CO2 at the plant (assumed at 90%) would increase CCS competitiveness; 
though this could be counterbalanced by potential leakage from reservoirs (our simulations show 
that leakage rates of 0.5% per year would jeopardize the deployment of this technology). 
 
Figure 5. CCS 
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Summing up, an equilibrium investment strategy in the energy sector that can achieve the two 
stabilization targets at reasonable economic costs (about 2.1% of global GDP in the 450 ppm case, 
see Section 5) exists. This energy investment strategy is based on the massive deployment of 
existing technologies (nuclear, solar and coal+CCS). It requires huge investments and urgent 
decisions. In the next section, we will explore how the potential availability of new energy 
technologies, developed through adequate R&D expenditures, can modify the investment scenario 
in the energy sector. 
 
4. Innovation Strategies for Energy Efficiency and Technology Breakthrough. 
The previous section has outlined the need for a profound transformation of the energy sector, 
particularly if an ambitious climate target is to be achieved. Massive deployment of technologies 
that are controversial, such as nuclear power, or whose reliability and affordability is still to be 
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 A coal+CCS power plant emits roughly 1/3 of a natural gas one. Constraining the potential deployment of nuclear and 
renewables would offset this effect, since the power sector would have fewer options. A similar effect would result 
from the deployment of very low carbon options in the non-electric sector, since it would alleviate the mitigation effort 
required from the power sector, as shown in Section 4. 
proved, such as CCS, indicate that currently known technologies alone might not suffice, 
especially in the mid- to long- term, and that the simultaneous achievement of global economic 
and environmental wellbeing is likely to ultimately rest on our ability to produce innovation. This 
is especially important for sectors that, at present, have a restricted portfolio of abatement options, 
such as transport. It is also important in case some of the mitigation alternatives described in the 
previous section do not deliver their expected abatement potential. 
The technology and innovation features of the WITCH model allow us to devise the optimal 
combination of investments in currently available technologies and in R&D to bring about the 
technology advancement needed for both energy efficiency improvements and de-carbonization. 
WITCH features separate R&D investments for energy efficiency enhancements and for the 
development of breakthrough technologies in both the electric and non-electric sector. We can 
therefore compute the equilibrium R&D investments that countries need to implement to achieve 
the required improvements in energy efficiency and timely market penetration for new carbon free 
energy technologies. We refer to these technologies as “backstops”. They substitute nuclear power 
for power generation and oil in the non-electric sector. For a complete description, see the 
Appendix. 
Figure 6 shows global public energy R&D expenditures. In the left-hand panel, we plot 
historical investment in R&D as share of Gross World Product (GWP); in the right-hand panel we 
plot optimal R&D investment in the three scenarios being examined. Historic data shows the well 
known decline in public expenditure for energy related R&D after the 1980 peak caused by the oil 
crises. Very low oil prices in the 1990s led to cuts in public expenditure, which have yet to regain 
momentum despite the oil price surge of the past few years. A very different picture of future R&D 
investments emerges from the two scenarios considered here. While the baseline scenario foresees 
low and stable investments in R&D, both climate policy scenarios require a significant innovation 
effort.  
For the 450 ppm case, energy expenditures ramp up to roughly 0.07% of GDP, the same share 
that prevailed in the 1980s. The public sector would thus be required to invest roughly 40-50 
billion USD per year, globally, in the years to come; given the long time lags that separate research 
from commercialization, the innovation effort must be carried out immediately to allow for 
innovative technologies to become competitive in the medium term6. It should be pointed out that 
such investment inflow, although sizeable, is two to three orders of magnitude smaller than the 
investments needed to de-carbonize the energy sector using already existing technologies. The 
strategy based on R&D investments can thus be thought of as a hedging policy. 
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 We assume that a ten-year lag time is necessary for R&D investments to bring cost reductions in backstops. See the 
Appendix for more details. 
The less stringent 550 ppm scenario shows a more gradual innovation pathway, with 
expenditure rising over time to eventually reach figures similar to those in the 450 ppm scenario, 
only with a 20-year delay.    
 
Figure 6. Public Energy R&D Investments across scenarios to 2050 
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A key policy question is where such public R&D investments should be directed to. Table 2 
shows the optimal allocation of R&D investment between energy efficiency and de-carbonization 
programs, in both the electric and non-electric sectors, for the 450 scenario.  
 
Table 2. Destination of R&D expenditure in a 450 scenario 
 2010 2030 2050 
Energy Efficiency 25% 40% 48% 
Low carbon innovation in 
non-electric sector 
64% 48% 42% 
Low carbon innovation in 
power generation 
11% 12% 12% 
 
 
It shows that the non-electric sector, particularly to substitute the transport-led non-electric oil 
demand, should receive most of the innovation funding initially, though over time energy 
efficiency innovation expenditure increases its relevance and eventually takes the lead (in 2050). 
The power sector is allocated a smaller but constant share. This shift in the timing is due to the 
very nature of investment in breakthrough technologies: a flow of investments in specific R&D is 
needed to continue improving energy efficiency, which exhibits decreasing marginal returns. On 
the other hand, investing in backstop R&D builds a stock which decreases the costs of the 
technology with very high returns at the beginning. Once the technology becomes available and 
economically competitive, then investing in backstop R&D becomes less important as a channel to 
decrease the price of the backstop technology. In other words, R&D in energy efficiency does not 
have a permanent effect, while R&D in backstop does. Note also that R&D investment in 
backstops substitute part of the energy efficiency R&D when the 450ppm stabilization target is to 
be achieved without the aid of the backstop technologies, though investments in the backstop 
technologies remain higher than in the BaU (see Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7. Energy R&D Investments/GDP for BaU and 450 scenarios with and  
without the possibility of breakthrough innovation. 
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The possibility of technology breakthroughs in the electricity sector also has an effect on the 
optimal investments in already known technologies. For example, investments in CCS are 
crucially affected by the presence of backstop technologies. In the 450 scenario, CCS investment 
no longer displays the peak effect observed in Figure 5. The reason for this is the presence of a 
carbon free backstop in the non-electric sector: it relieves the electricity sector from an excessive 
mitigation burden, which jeopardized CCS in the long run due to the non-perfect capture rate of 
carbon. 
 
5. Economic Impacts of Different Technological Scenarios 
The previous sections have illustrated the need for drastic changes in the way we consume and 
produce energy. They highlighted the need to mobilize substantial investment resources towards 
carbon free technologies. This is likely to have important implications for the economic system. In 
this section, we summarize the economic impact of both 550 ppm and 450 ppm stabilization 
scenarios, with a particular focus on the role played by energy technologies.  
Table 3 shows net present value losses of GWP for both climate policy scenarios and different 
technology settings7. The reference case shows how, in the 550 ppm scenario, costs are almost 
negligible, whereas they are significant in the 450 ppm case. The cost difference between the two 
mitigation policies is a direct consequence of the different magnitudes of energy sector 
modifications required. It also stems from the non-linearity of endogenous marginal abatement 
curves in the model. The 450 ppm policy requires drastic cuts in emissions, especially in the 
second half of the century, when emissions are stabilized at around 3GtC/yr. With growing 
economies and population, this entails a significant increase in energy costs, particularly as 
mitigation gets more and more stringent. The effect of temporal discounting is partially 
compensated by the growing dimension of economic activity. 
 
 
Table 3. Total costs of stabilization (Net present value, percent of GWP losses at 5% constant 
discount rate). 
 
 550 ppm 450ppm 
 
Reference case 
 
0.27% 2.1% 
Limited power 
technologies 
1.08% 3.6% 
Breakthrough 
innovation 
0.22% 1.1% 
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 The numbers shown include the avoided climate damages induced by the policies. However, the NPV calculations at 
5% put most of the weight on early periods for which almost no temperature decrease is achieved, so that gross 
economic losses are only 10-20% above the ones indicated here. 
 The economic effect of limiting the power sector technologies described in Section 3 is shown 
in the second row. Indeed, if we assume a world in which the expansion of wind and solar 
technologies is bound by limits to large scale deployment, the options to expand nuclear energy are 
limited (possibly because of political or environmental reasons) and IGCC+CCS technologies do 
not become competitive8, then achieving a stabilization target is much more costly, with an 
increase in the order of 1.5 to 3 times. On the other hand, allowing for R&D investments in new 
low carbon technologies, that would enable breakthrough innovation, is shown to be able to 
substantially reduce the economic policy costs. These differences are particularly important for the 
stringent 450 ppm target, which requires a fundamental restructuring of the energy sector.  
 However different these scenarios may be, it should be noted that, in the short term, a strong 
carbon price signal would be needed to bring about what could be called a technology revolution. 
As shown in Figure 8, left panel9, the carbon signal of a reference 450 scenario is very similar to 
that of the most optimistic case of breakthrough inventions.  
 Higher GWP losses will be experienced initially in the breakthrough technologies case (right 
panel) in order to make R&D resources available, but this would pay off in the future allowing for 
the substantial cost reductions shown in Table 3.  
 
Figure 8. Carbon price (left) and GWP loss (right) for a 450 scenario with  
and without the possibility of breakthrough innovation. 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
$/t
CO
2
450
450 with
Breakthrough
innovation
0.0%
0.2%
0.4%
0.6%
0.8%
1.0%
1.2%
1.4%
1.6%
1.8%
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
450 with
Breakthrough
innovation
450
 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has investigated optimal investment strategies in the energy sector for two climate 
policy scenarios. Our results show that the stabilization of CO2 concentrations at 550 and 450 ppm 
                                                 
8
 The specific constraints used are: nuclear energy cannot expand above current generation levels, CCS is not allowed; 
W&S can provide at most 35% of total electricity. 
9
 The carbon prices displayed assume full country participation to an international carbon market; in case of fragmented 
agreements, they would rise very significantly. 
(650 and 550 CO2 equivalent) is feasible at reasonable economic costs, but that it requires radical 
changes in the energy sector and large investments in R&D.  
Both energy efficiency and the de-carbonization of energy should be pursued. Currently known 
technologies in the power sector such as nuclear, renewables and CCS will be essential, but very 
large investments – greater than the energy sector has ever experienced – will be needed. At the 
same time, R&D investments for the development of new technologies, especially in the transport 
sector, will be required. Public R&D expenditures should increase considerably, over the peak 
levels of the 1980s for at least 3 decades. Given the long time lags inherent to the innovation 
process, such investments should be made starting today.  
Our results thus support the call for R&D policies that complement climate stabilization 
policies and reduce the costs of limiting dangerous climate change. They also indicate that a strong 
price signal will nonetheless be needed if the climate change challenge is to be met, regardless of 
whether we expect low carbon breakthrough technologies to be available in the future, because of 
the inertia in the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere and low decay rates. 
Substantial economic resources should be mobilized to attain the climate protection goal. This 
will impose economic costs on societies around the world, the magnitude of which will depend on 
the stringency of the target, and on the availability of commercial and non-commercial 
technologies.  
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This paper analyses optimal investments in innovation when dealing with a stringent climate target and with
the uncertain effectiveness of R&D. The innovation needed to achieve the deep cut in emissions is modeled
by a backstop carbon-free technology whose cost depends on R&D investments. To better represent the
process of technological progress, we assume that R&D effectiveness is uncertain. By means of a simple
analytical model, we show how accounting for the uncertainty that characterizes technological advancement
yields higher investments in innovation and lower policy costs. We then conﬁrm the results via a numerical
analysis performed with a stochastic version of WITCH, an energy–economy–climate model. The results
stress the importance of a correct speciﬁcation of the technological change process in economy–climate
models.
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1. Introduction
Technological change is an uncertain phenomenon. In its most
thriving form, ground-breaking innovation is so unpredictable that
any attempt to model the uncertain processes that govern it is close to
impossible. Despite the complexities, research dealing with long-term
processes, such as climate change, would largely beneﬁt from
incorporating the uncertainty of technological advance. Yet, bringing
uncertainty into models has proved particularly difﬁcult, especially
with regards to technological change, see Clarke and Weyant (2002).
On a more general level, the challenge of modelling endogenous
technological change in all its features, including randomness,
becomes increasingly important when dealing with the analysis of
stringent climate targets. Many energy–economy models have been
used to perform cost effectiveness of climate policies. Not surprisingly,
the related literature has produced a dispersed range of costs
estimates for these policies, resting on the different formulations
and assumptions that stand behind eachmodel. Nonetheless, one core
fact upon which everyone seems to agree is the role of technological
change in shaping those costs, see for example the summary of an
updated modeling comparison exercise on innovation in Grubb et al.
(2006).
The recognition of the relevance of this issue has led researchers to
model technological change as an endogenous process, although
typically in a deterministic fashion. The existing literature accounting
for uncertainty has mostly concentrated on the uncertainty affecting
climate damages and abatement costs, as well as other parameters,
such as the discount factor. Within this framework, few studies have
looked at the consequences of uncertainty on innovation. In particular,
Baker et al. (2006a) investigate the effects of climate uncertainty on
R&D investments, to verify whether innovation serves as a hedge
against uncertainty, but ﬁnd no unambiguous answer: optimal R&D
might increase or decrease with uncertainty depending on a variety of
factors regarding the speciﬁcation of technological change and
uncertainty.
However, as noted above, little focus has been devoted to the
analysis of the intrinsic uncertainty of innovation, and how uncertainty
might change results and policy recommendations. Baker and Adu-
Bonnah (2008) is the only case to our knowledge that tackles this issue
in the context of climate change.1 They analyze how optimal R&D
investments changewith the risk-proﬁle of the R&D program andwith
climate uncertainty. They differentiate between two types of
technologies, and ﬁnd that technological speciﬁcation and climate
damages are key in the role played by uncertainty.
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The current paper delves into the issue of uncertain technological
progress when a climate obligation is in place. In particular, we seek to
analyze different optimal responses in terms of investments and
climate policy costs when we model innovation as a backstop
technology characterized by either a deterministic or an uncertain
process. To this scope, we ﬁrst develop a simple analytical model.
Then, we augment the hybrid integrated assessment model WITCH,
introduced in Bosetti et al. (2006), to incorporate a carbon-free
backstop technology whose cost is currently not competitive but can
be lowered by investing in innovation in the form of R&D. The R&D
outcome is modeled as uncertain, and we thus devise a stochastic
version of the model to account for this effect. We restrict our analysis
to a climate policy of 450 ppmv CO2 only (i.e. roughly 550 CO2e)
stabilization.
Both our analytical and numerical results show how accounting for
the uncertainty of technological advancement yields higher invest-
ments in innovation aimed to decrease the abatement costs via a
backstop technology. The analytical set-up provides an unequivocal
relation between the uncertainty and innovation effort, and the
richness of the numerical model a thorough representation of the
impacts in terms of technological change. The ﬁndings of this paper
stress the importance of a correct speciﬁcation of technological change
in economy–climate models when assessing the optimal level of R&D
investments as well as the cost of a climate policy. Our results are in
line with Baker and Adu-Bonnah (2008), although in our case the
results are independent of the climate target.
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section we devise a
simple toy model, and present the ﬁrst analytical insights. Section 3
deals with the implementation of uncertain technological change in
the WITCH model, and shows the numerical results. Section 4
concludes.
2. A simple model of uncertain innovation
To analyze the issue of uncertain innovationwe introduce a simple
analytical model. We use a two-period, two-technology model where
the social planner minimizes costs but needs to achieve a given
environmental target. We resort to such a standard framework to
ensure an analogy with the climate change policies costs effectiveness
studies of numerical models, such as those presented in the second
part of the paper. Although less realistic than the numerical counter-
part, such a framework mimics the most essential features of the
numerical analysis and can thus provide a useful generalization of the
problem.
Given a target level of abatement to be undertaken during the
second period, the planner can choose a combination of two carbon-
free technologies: a traditional technology (say nuclear ﬁssion) and an
advanced, backstop technology (say nuclear fusion). Abatement costs
with the backstop technology are initially higher than with the
traditional one, but can be reduced by investing in R&D during the ﬁrst
period. We introduce uncertainty by modeling the R&D outcome on
the abatement cost of the backstop technology as uncertain: the
innovation effort leads to a central value reduction in abatement costs
with a given probability p, and to lower and higher abatement costs
states with probability 1−pð Þ
2
, respectively. The high cost state represents
the failure of the R&D program: abatement costs are not reduced by
the innovation effort, and remain higher than the traditional carbon-
free technology costs for any level of abatement. In this case, the
planner chooses not to operate the backstop technology, because it is
too costly, and resorts to the, cheaper, traditional technology. The low
cost state represents a greater than expected success of the R&D
program: backstop technology costs are always lower than in the
central case, the lower the costs the higher the abatement pursued
with the advanced technology.
The objective of the social planner is to choose the optimal level of
investment in innovation, together with abatement shares in both
traditional and backstop technologies, such that expected total costs
are minimized subject to a given level of abatement. Formally:
min
I
C Ið Þ þ Ew min
μT ;μB
CT μTð Þð Þ þ C μB; I;wð Þ
 
s:t: μT þ μB ¼ μ μT; μB; Iz0
ð1Þ
where I, µT, µB are respectively the innovation effort (i.e. investment in
R&D) and the abatement in the traditional and backstop technologies.
C, CT, CB are the respective cost functions. w represents the uncertain
effectiveness of R&D. μ is the exogenously set abatement target.
This formulation requires that the abatement cost functions using
the two technologies are separable. That is, we assume that an amount
of abatement undertaken using one technology doesn't affect the costs
of abatement using the other technology. Although this assumption is
often violated in real world application, where technologies develop
around common technological clusters, we retain it here as we model
the two abatement technologies as belonging to very different classes,
e.g. concentrated base load providers such nuclear or CCS on one side,
and smaller scale intermittent renewables on the other.
To simplify the problem, let's assume the backstop technology
takes value CB(µB, I) with probability p, while with probability 1−p2 R&D
is more effective and backstop costs are lower than expected (and
equal to CBL(µBL , I)). In the remaining 1−p2 cases, R&D fails, and the costs of
backstop technology are not modiﬁed by innovation (and are equal to
CB
H(µBH)). As stated earlier, the main scope of our analysis is to compare
the certain formulation (case where p=1) vis à vis the most uncertain
one (case where p=0). In order to make these two cases equivalent,
we equate the central case cost function to themean between the high
and low case, i.e. we set:
CB μB; Ið Þ ¼
1
2
CHB μBð Þ þ
1
2
CLB μB; Ið Þ ð2Þ
The problem can thus be restated as follows:
min
I
C Ið Þ þ pmin
μCT ;μ
C
B
CT μTð Þ þ CCB μCB ; I
  
þ1−p
2
min
μLT ;μ
L
B
CT μLT
 þ CLB μLB; I  
þ1−p
2
min
μHT ;μ
H
B
CT μHT
 þ CHB μHB  
8>>>><
>>>>:
9>>>>=
>>>>;
s:t: μ iT þ μ iB ¼ μ μ iT; μ iB; Iz0 i ¼ C; L;H
ð3Þ
Solving the problem backward and labeling with ⁎ the optimal
values for the abatement shares in the two technologies, we can
simplify our expression in the following way:
min
I
C Ið Þ þ p CT μC⁎T
 þ CB μC⁎B ; I  
þ1−p
2
CT μL⁎T
 	
þ CLB μL⁎B ; I
 	h i
þ1−p
2
CT μð Þ
8>><
>>:
9>>=
>>;
s:t: μ iT þ μ iB ¼ μ μ iT; μ iB; Iz0 i ¼ C; L
ð4Þ
where the third term in brackets, the optimal cost in the case the R&D
program fails, is the cost of traditional technology only, i.e.
CT μHT
 þ CHB μHB  ¼ CT μð Þ.
One of the questions we are interested in tackling with this set-up
is the effect of uncertainty on the costs of meeting the environmental
obligation. For example, wemight wonder whether knowing that R&D
will make the backstop technology either extremely competitive or
totally ineffective affects the costs of reducing carbon emissions with
respect to the case of certain average innovation effectiveness. The
following result clariﬁes this issue.
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Result 1. We ﬁnd that while the abatement costs using the backstop
technology in the central case are equal to the average of the low and high
R&D effectiveness cases (Eq. (2)), the total costs of meeting the
environmental target are higher for the central certain case. For the
algebra underlying this result, we refer the reader to Appendix A. This
result suggests that R&D programmes with high/low payoffs are
preferable whenever an alternative, less advanced, abating technology
is available to limit the downside of R&D failure.
A second issuewe seek to investigate is the effect of uncertaintyon the
behavior of investments inR&D, i.e.we ask ourselveswhat is the sign of dI
⁎
dp
.
If dI
⁎
dp
b0 thenwehave that R&D investments increasewith uncertainty. This
would imply that modeling R&D as having an uncertain outcome, a fact
oftenbelieved tobe thecase,wouldyielda shareof innovationhigher than
if uncertainty were neglected. In Appendix B we prove that investigating
the signof dI
⁎
dp
coincideswith comparingmarginal beneﬁts of innovation for
different levels of abatement:
MBC μC⁎B
 	
−MBC μL⁎B
 	
≶0?
where MB stands for the reduction in abatement cost using the
backstop technology as a result of a marginal dollar spent on
innovation.2
The equation compares the marginal beneﬁt of innovation in the
central case computed for levels of abatement resulting from the
central and low cost cases, µB⁎ and µBL⁎; its sign depends on how the
marginal beneﬁt of R&D changes with the level of abatement. In this
paper we restrict our attention to the case of innovation lowering the
marginal abatement costs for every level of abatement.3 Thus,
marginal beneﬁts weakly increase with abatement. Therefore, since
abatement in the low case is always higher than (or at least equal to)
the abatement in the central case (µBL⁎≥µBC⁎), we ﬁnd that dI
⁎
dp
V0, which
leads us to the second result.
Result 2. We assume that marginal beneﬁts of innovation increase with
abatement using the backstop technology. Then, for interior solutions for
the abatement variables, investments in innovation increase with
uncertainty. Conversely, innovation is uninﬂuenced by uncertainty
for the case μL⁎B ¼ μC⁎B ¼ μ , the corner solution implying that the
traditional technology is never employed when innovation is
productive. In addition, this latter result also holds when marginal
beneﬁts of innovation are constant with abatement, for examplewhen
innovation shifts down the abatement curve by a constant.
Ruling out the last two special cases, the intuition for the result is
the following. Let us concentrate on the two extreme cases of zero
uncertainty, i.e. the central case is always achieved (p=1), and full
uncertainty, i.e. R&D has either full success or full failure with 50%
chance each (p=0). Choosing the optimal level of R&D investments
implies equating the marginal costs of generating innovationwith the
marginal beneﬁts of decreasing the abatement costs. When confront-
ing the two cases, we should compare the marginal beneﬁts of
innovation for the central value (zero uncertainty) and low value (full
uncertainty). The latter has half the chances of occurring, but marginal
beneﬁts are by construction twice those of the central case, so that the
fraction due to the probability cancels out. However, since the share of
abatement using the backstop technology is higher in the low cost
case and assuming that marginal beneﬁts increase with the level of
abatement, marginal beneﬁts of innovation are higher with full
uncertainty than with no uncertainty. That is, innovation is more
productive when its outcome is explicitly modelled as uncertain.
How does this ﬁnding translate into real life considerations? First, one
has to bear in mind that the social planner can pick from a variety of
technologies to achieve an environmental target, say, to reduce CO2
emissions. Investing inR&D is a riskyprocedure.However, if it fails existing
technologies would be able to limit the costs of abatement, whereas if it is
successful, the beneﬁts would be higher than would have been in the
central case. This payoff asymmetry is such that the upside of super
productive innovation outweighs the downside of failure. Hence, in the
presence of innovative technologies, a risk-neutral planner would choose
to invest more when R&D outcome is uncertain.
Our set-up and results are similar to those in Baker and Adu-
Bonnah (2008). They too ﬁnd that the relation between uncertainty
and innovation depends on whether marginal beneﬁts of R&D
increase or decrease with the level of abatement. Even though the
sign of this relationship is in principle ambiguous, this ambiguity
depends on what technology is under consideration (see Baker et al.
(2006b)). R&D aimed at cleaner and more efﬁcient carbon technol-
ogies has increasing marginal beneﬁts for moderate emissions
reductions; however, this positive effect decreases and eventually
drops to zero as the game gets tougher and stringent emission
reductions have to be met. A different story holds for carbon-free
technologies, where the effect of R&D is that of lowering the marginal
cost curves for any level of abatement. So the issue of ambiguity in the
sign could be interpreted more practically as: what type of
technologies is technical change affecting in the model? When large
emission cuts are at stake, carbon technologies have a lower margin
for efﬁcient improvement than carbon-free technologies (i.e. nuclear,
renewables, carbon-free backstop) which would play a major role. In
this case marginal beneﬁts of innovation are increasing with the level
of abatement. Conversely, in the case of moderate climate policy,
efﬁciency improvement would play a relevant role. But again, in this
case marginal beneﬁts of innovation would hardly decrease in the
range of abatement under consideration, given the small mitigation
effort required. This argument justiﬁes the increasing marginal
beneﬁts assumption that is behind our results.4
In contrast with Baker and Adu-Bonnah (2008), our result is
independent of how stringent the climate target might be. Since the
productivity gain from the low cost case is always twice that of the
central case, the upside of an uncertain program outweighs the
downside, notwithstanding the level of abatement. In the limit case
when abatement is totally achieved by the backstop technology in
both central and low cost cases, then uncertainty would not affect the
optimal choice of R&D.
3. Numerical analysis
In this section we turn to the numerical analysis of the model. In
order to investigate the role of uncertain technological change, we
devise a version of the energy–economy–climate model WITCH
featuring an R&D-driven carbon-free backstop technology. Innovation
can lower the price of this otherwise non-competitive technology, but
it is modeled in a stochastic setting in order to account for the
uncertainty of the R&D outcome. We ﬁrst introduce the backstop
technology sector and then discuss numerical results for different
simulation experiments.
3.1. Uncertain backstop technology in WITCH
WITCH—World Induced Technical Change Hybrid model—is an
integrated assessment model for the analysis of climate change and
energy issues. For a detailed description of the model see Bosetti et al.
2 The traditional technology is eliminated from the marginal analysis for the
Envelope Theorem since it is not affected by the innovation in the backstop technology
as noted in the above discussion on the abatement cost functions separability. We
thank an anonymous referee for clarifying this issue.
3 This directly follows from the choice of investigating R&D efforts reducing the costs
of a backstop, carbon-free, technology, as discussed in detail later in the paper.
4 Mathematically, innovation shifting down abatement curve ensures that the value
function of the minimization problem is convex in the shift. Thus, the cost asymmetry
inequality shown in Eq. (10) holds because of Jensen inequality. We thank an
anonymous referee for this remark.
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(2006, 2007). It is a regional model featuring an inter-temporal
optimal growth top-down part that is hard linked with a bottom-up
description of the energy sector. The energy sector is described by
nested constant elasticity of substitution functions which describe the
transformation of primary energy carriers into ﬁnal energy services.
World regions strategically interact in a game theoretic set-up by
playing an open-loop Nash game on global externalities. Technological
change is endogenous and acts both via energy efﬁciency R&D and
learning-by-doing in power capacity. The model is solved numerically
with GAMS/CONOPT.
The non-cooperative baseline predicts global CO2 emissions to reach
around 20 GtC by 2100, a ﬁgure in line with IPCC B2 SRES scenarios.
These ﬁgures show how the free-riding incentives that characterize
global stock externalities such as CO2 make it difﬁcult to achieve
substantial emission reduction in a cost beneﬁt analysis setting.
Concerns over the risk of prolonged emissions put forward by
climatologists and specialized bodies such as the IPCC justify the resort
to cost effectiveness analysis of given climate goals. In this paper we
focus on the speciﬁc target of stabilizing atmospheric CO2 concentration
to 450 ppmv (550 ppmv CO2 equivalent) by 2100, a target probabil-
istically associated with that of maintaining within 2 °C the global
temperature increase above pre-industrial level within the century.
As evident from Fig. 1, a climate policy of this kind entails signiﬁcant
emission reductions: for example, an emission path respecting the
450 ppmv targetwould curb emissions by 50% in 2030, and up to 85% by
the end of the century. Such a scenario is clearly challenging, and will
come at a cost in terms of economic growth, without adequate
technological advancement.
For example, simulations using theWITCHmodel show that on the
basis of currently existing technologies the stabilization effort would
lead to a power generation mix such as the one shown in Fig. 2. Three
technologies are believed to provide the low/zero carbon electricity
indispensable in such a severe mitigation scenario. First, early
deployment of advanced coal combined with CCS to achieve some of
the needed reductions of emissions. Second, nuclear power that
would become the predominant technology by mid-century, with
almost half of the electricity share. Finally, renewables, expected to
signiﬁcantly contribute from the second half of the century. In
Fig. 1. CO2 emissions in the BAU and 450 ppmv cases.
Fig. 2. Power generation shares in the 450 ppmv stabilization case. From top to bottom: nuclear, hydro, oil, gas, trad. coal, advanced coal + CCS, wind and solar.
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addition to this, given the comparatively greater difﬁculty in cutting
emissions in the non-electricity sector, R&D-driven energy saving will
also be indispensable.
A stabilization scenario of this kind appears ambitious, for a variety of
reasons. First, it would imply considerable costs, quantiﬁable in a net
present value output loss during this century of around 2% (at a constant
discount rate of 5%). Second, current technologies facemanyconstraints. A
massive deployment of nuclear energy would entail increased waste
management costs and proliferation risks: the lack of resolution of these
problems—for instance through technological advances—means the
scenario will be unlikely to develop. Similarly, the high land use demand
of currently available renewables technologies in power generation,
constitutes a serious challenge for the penetration target needed to
stabilize at 450 ppmv. Unavoidably, any stringent stabilization scenario
will call for innovation in non-carbon energy technologies. Future energy
scenarios depending on such backstop technologies cannot be conceived
without a focuson thecrucial roleofR&D investments as themain impulse
fostering the required technological innovation.
We follow the lines of the toymodel by introducing anR&Ddependent
backstop technology in WITCH. We model it as a power generation
technology, that emits zero carbon per unit of electricity and is renewable
in the sense that it doesn't rely on rapidly exhaustible natural resources. It
couldbe thoughtof as a ground-breaking innovation suchas fusionpower,
or more likely as a portfolio of advanced versions of technologies such as
advanced solar power, new nuclear etc. We assume this representative
technology to be currently uneconomical, but that its cost can be
decreased by means of investments in innovation. This framework is
coherent with the one used in the analytical model in the ﬁrst part of the
paper. The “traditional” nuclear power technology can be substituted by a
cheaper (e.g. deployable on a larger scale) one, only if enough R&D
investments are deployed.
Speciﬁcally, the investment cost for building a unit of power
capacity ($/kW), ICback, depends on cumulated R&D, KR&Dback, via a
power formulation as follows5:
ICback n; tð Þ ¼
ICback n;0ð Þ
1þ KR&Dback t;nð Þð Þη
ð5Þ
i.e. at time t, for region n, the investment cost decreases with the R&D
capital depending on the learning parameter η.6 The capital
depreciates with rate δ and can be increased by investing in
knowledge IR&Dback through an innovation possibility frontier of
this kind:
KR&Dback n; t þ 1ð Þ ¼ 1−δð ÞKR&Dback n; tð Þ
þ aIR&Dback t;nð ÞbKR&Dback t;nð Þc ð6Þ
The presence of the stock in the possibility frontier ensures the
“standing on shoulders” effect, and the exponents b and c sum up to
less than one to model diminishing returns to research. Such a
formulation has received empirical support for energy innovation by
Popp (2004).
We assume that the backstop technology enters as a linear
substitute of nuclear power in the energy sector nest; in this way
we allow the new technology to displace the technology that most
controversially contributed to carbon-free energy generation in the
original formulation of the model; at the same time the nested CES
structure of the electricity sector with higher than unity elasticities
allows the phase out of all other power generation plants, although at
a higher cost than would have otherwise happened assuming linear
relations. To account for the industrialization lag that stands between
research and commercialization, the backstop technology is assumed
to be available from 2050 onwards only, even though we will test our
result also for different entry periods.
Our primary interest in this paper is to analyze the effect of
modeling uncertainty on the level of investments and on the costs of
the policy. To account for this, we model the outcome of the R&D
investments as uncertain: thus ICback(n, t,w) also depends on the state
of the world, w. We assume that the effectiveness of R&D on
decreasing the backstop costs can turn out to be either of the three
following cases: in the “best” case (w=b) the investment cost of the
backstop decreases with R&D as shown in Eq. (5); in the “failure” case
(w= f) the investment cost of the backstop remains the same as the
initial one, irrespective of the level of investments. This R&D failure
case is equivalent to assume that the learning parameter η is equal to
zero. Both these low and high cost states have the probability of
occurring 1−p
2
each. In the “central” case (w=c), with remaining p
chances, the investment cost is the average of the two limit cases. To
summarize:
1−p
2
: ICback n; t; bð Þ ¼ ICback n;0ð Þ1þ KR&Dback t;nð Þð Þη
p : ICback n; t; cð Þ ¼ 12 ICback n;0ð Þ1þ KR&Dback t;nð Þð Þη þ
1
2
ICback n;0ð Þ
1−p
2
: ICback n; t; fð Þ ¼ ICback n;0ð Þ
ð7Þ
This framework mimics the toy model presented in the previous
section and allows us to control for the effect of R&D uncertainty. We
can run the model for different values of p—the probability of the
central case—and evaluate the consequences of uncertainty on
innovation. In order to include in the model these concomitant
alternative scenarios we develop an implicit7 stochastic version of the
WITCH model. All model variables, previously deﬁned on regions,
time and scenarios, are redeﬁned on nodes belonging to a scenarios
5 This speciﬁcation is similar to that used for experience curves, and has been
applied to backstops by Popp (2006).
6 In this ﬁrst application learning occurs independently at a regional level. As a
future extension of the model we plan to include international spillovers of knowledge.
7 Instead of accounting explicitly for the non-anticipative constraints, non-
anticipativity is implicitly deﬁned through characterization of predecessor/successor
relationships among nodes in the scenario tree.
Fig. 3. Scenario tree in the stochastic version of WITCH. Variables, as ICback in this example, are redeﬁned depending on nodes.
5V. Bosetti, M. Tavoni / Energy Economics xxx (2008) xxx–xxx
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Please cite this article as: Bosetti, V., Tavoni, M., Uncertain R&D, backstop technology and GHGs stabilization, Energy Economics (2008),
doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2008.03.002
tree as the one depicted in Fig. 3. The objective function to be
maximized for each region is the expected utility.
3.2. Numerical results
In this section we report results from the numerical exercise carried
outwithWITCH. ACO2 only concentration target of 450 ppmv is assumed
throughout the analysis. We compare the deterministic case with the
uncertain formulation. The average of the latter coincides with the
deterministic one to ensure the equivalence of the comparison exercise. In
theuncertain formulation there is a 50% chance to achieve the central case
and a 25% chance to achieve the failure and best cases, respectively. In
accordance with the analytical analysis, we assume a risk-neutral social
planner (we will then relax this assumption).
Since we are investigating the role of uncertainty on innovation, it
is interesting to compare the R&D investments in the stochastic case
and in the equivalent deterministic case, before uncertainty is
resolved in 2050. Results of investments on innovation are presented
in Fig. 4; the graph shows that optimal R&D investments are always
higher in the stochastic formulation with respect to the deterministic
Fig. 4. R&D investments for backstop.
Fig. 5. Electricity with backstop.
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case before the resolution of uncertainty. The numerical analysis thus
conﬁrms that modeling R&D as having an uncertain outcome induces
more innovation effort, as predicted by the analytical example outlined
in Section 2. As expected, in the stochastic setting, once uncertainty is
resolved, R&D is higher for the best case than for the central, and it is
zero for the failure state.
To provide an insight into what different R&D investment paths
imply in terms of technology adoption throughout the century, in
Fig. 5 we show the values of electricity generated with the backstop
technology in the various cases. From the last Figure we know that the
R&D investments in the deterministic case are low compared to the
stochastic one: such a reduced innovation effort sets back the
competitiveness of the backstop technology. This translates into a
lower deployment of the innovative technology in the deterministic
case vis à vis the stochastic one, as is apparent from the graph (with
the obvious exception of the R&D “failure” case).
As expected, the opposite behavior holds with regard to the
existing technology competing with the backstop, i.e. nuclear power:
the higher costs of the backstop technology lead to a higher nuclear
power share in the deterministic formulation than in the uncertain
one (except for the failure case, see Fig. 6). All in all, accounting for
R&D uncertainty fosters the deployment of innovative technologies
such as the backstop one. Through the path dependencies that
characterize the evolution of technologies, this would act as a control
on the negative externalities that affect the currently used technol-
ogies and deﬁne their limited deployment capacity. For example, in
the WITCH model we explicitly account for waste management and
proliferation risks (as well as uranium ore costs) as a global externality
countries have incentives to free-ride on. The higher investments in
innovation stemming from the uncertain characterization of R&D have
the effect of reducing this externality.
The other issue we are dealing with in this paper is the effect of
R&D uncertainty on the costs of complying to the climate policy. Are
we miscalculating stabilization costs by neglecting uncertain efﬁcacy
of innovation in fostering a backstop technology? And, more generally,
what is the role of a carbon-free power generation technology in
determining these costs?
Numerical results again conﬁrm the insights of the analytical
model: policy costs are always lower when accounting for uncertainty,
reaching a 2.3% gain by the end of the century with respect to the
deterministic case. Although limited by the presence of an existing,
largely deployable, carbon-free technology, such as the nuclear one,
these cost variations indicate that modeling uncertainty explicitly
alleviates the mitigation burden of the climate policy.
In order to test the results for robustness and to understand the
effect of key assumptions, we have repeated simulations for a different
set of assumptions on entry time and the level of risk aversion.8
In Fig. 7 we present the R&D results when we assume different
entry times of the backstop technology (“early” in 2040, and “late” in
2060). The picture shows that early resolution of uncertainty on the
efﬁcacy of the R&D programme leads to a higher level of optimal R&D
investments. The contrary holds in the case of late discovery of the
program's effectiveness. Although the effect on the levels of invest-
ments is signiﬁcant, entry time has a small impact on policy costs. As
noted above, this result depends on the presence of the traditional
carbon-free technology (nuclear) which has a buffer effect.
As a concluding analysis, we drop the assumption of risk neutrality
and investigate what happens when the central planner is risk-averse.
In this case, lower utility is attached to risky investments, and thus we
expect toﬁnd an effect contrary to the results presented so far.We start
by analysing the unit risk aversion case of logarithmic utility function.
Numerical results show that R&D investments in the uncertainty case
are indeed lower than for the reference risk-neutral analysis. The risk
aversion increase roughly halves innovation effort: for example, R&D
investments in 2050 drop from 10 to 5 USD billions. Despite this effect,
they remain higher than for the certain case (that for example has 2.2
USD billions investments in 2050), thus conﬁrming that the R&D
fostering effect of uncertainty remain valid for central planners with
unit risk version. Finally, we searched the risk aversion parameter for
which R&D investments are equal in both the certain and uncertain
cases. With the uncertainty parametrization used throughout the
Fig. 6. Electricity with nuclear.
8 In order to preserve the base year consumption and savings ﬁgures we have
adjusted the social time preference rate according to the new risk aversion value.
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paper, we ﬁnd that a social planner with a CRRA utility function and a
risk aversion coefﬁcient of 1.5 invests in innovation equally in both the
certain and uncertain cases. Higher risk aversions would result in
lower innovation shares under uncertainty.
4. Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the issue of uncertain technological
progress within environmental regulation. This is an important
research topic given the relevance of technical change in the global
warming literature and the uncertainty that characterizes all innova-
tion processes, yet a poorly investigated one. We have analyzed
optimal responses to uncertainty, in terms of R&D investments and
climate policy costs, by modeling innovation as a backstop technology
characterized by either a deterministic or an uncertain process. To this
purpose, we have developed a simple analytical model and modiﬁed
the hybrid integrated assessment model WITCH to account for a
carbon-free backstop technology dependent on uncertain R&D
realizations. We have performed a stochastic cost effectiveness
analysis of a CO2 stabilization policy of 450 ppmv.
Numerical results, in accordance with analytical insights, have
shown how modeling innovation in a backstop technology as an
uncertain process leads to higher optimal levels of R&D investments.
A detailed representation of the energy sector has allowed us to
capture path dependency in technological evolution, and therefore
to account for the consequences of different innovation efforts on
technology deployment and externality resolution. We have also
shown how uncertainty lowers climate policy costs, although the
rigidity of the energy sector—characterized by long-lasting invest-
ments with limited substitutability—is shown to constrain the
contribution of a technology breakthrough solely in the electricity
sector.
To check for the robustness of the results, we have tested the need
to model R&D uncertainty as an endogenous process by letting the
backstop entry time vary. We have shown how different timings of
backstop availability affect R&D investments and policy costs in the
expected direction but to a limited extent in terms of magnitude.
Finally, the role of social planner risk aversion has been analyzed and
shown to have a counterbalancing effect that reduces the gap in
innovation investments with and without uncertainty.
In this ﬁrst version of the model we have not considered the
possibility of international spillover of knowledge. This is an issue that
is relevant in both policy and modeling terms, as it can induce
contrasting effects. We are investigating it in a follow-up analysis.
Finally, future research includes the evaluation of innovation
uncertainty on the choice of policy instruments with a speciﬁc focus
on the role of free-riding.
Appendix A
Result 1. Within the analytical framework sketched in Section 2 we
prove that the costs of complying to the environmental target
diminish in uncertainty.
That is, labeling with V the optimal costs for the problem outlined
in Eq. (1), we need to show that dV
dp
N0:
The value function of the minimization problem is as follows:
V ¼ C I⁎
 	
þ p CT μC⁎T
 	
þ CCB μC⁎B ; I⁎
 	h i
þ 1− p
2
CT μL⁎T
 	
þ CLB μL⁎B ; I⁎
 	h i
þ 1− p
2
CT μð Þ ð8Þ
From the envelope theorem we know that:
dV
dp
¼ CT μC⁎T
 	
þ CCB μC⁎B ; I⁎
 	
−
1
2
CT μL⁎T
 	
þ CLB μL⁎B ; I⁎
 	h i
−
1
2
CT μð Þ ð9Þ
and so dV
dp
N0 if
CT μC⁎T
 	
þ CCB μC⁎B ; I⁎
 	
N
1
2
CT μL⁎T
 	
þ CLB μL⁎B ; I⁎
 	h i
þ 1
2
CT μð Þ ð10Þ
The right hand side of the equation is the sum of the minimized
costs in the best and worst (failure) cases, respectively. Evaluating the
best case function at a different abatement level, for instance at the
one that is optimal for the central case, would yield higher costs, so we
can write:
1
2
CT μC⁎T
 	
þ CLB μC⁎B ; I⁎
 	h i
N
1
2
CT μL⁎T
 	
þ CLB μL⁎B ; I⁎
 	h i
ð11Þ
and thus, in order to prove Eq. (10) it sufﬁces to show that:
CT μC⁎T
 	
þ CCB μC⁎B ; I⁎
 	
N
1
2
CT μC⁎T
 	
þ CLB μC⁎B ; I⁎
 	h i
þ 1
2
CT μð Þ ð12Þ
We know that the central case abatement cost CBC is the average of
the best and failure cases for any abatement. That is,
CCB μ
C⁎
B ; I
⁎
 	
¼ 1
2
CLB μ
C⁎
B ; I
⁎
 	
þ 1
2
CHB μ
C⁎
B
 	
ð13Þ
Fig. 7. Effect of entry time on backstop R&D investment.
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Inserting this equation in the preceding one and rearranging terms
we can rewrite the condition for costs diminishing in uncertainty as:
CT μC⁎T
 	
þ CHB μC⁎B
 	
NCT μð Þ ð14Þ
The LHS of the last equation is the cost of meeting the abatement
target in the failure case with a suboptimal allocation of abatement
between the technologies. By construction, abatement cost is
minimized in this case by doing all the work with the traditional
technology. Therefore the RHS is optimal and must have a lower cost
than the suboptimal LHS.
Appendix B
Result 2. We investigate the sign of dI
⁎
dp
, knowing that if dI
⁎
dp
b0 then we
have that R&D investments increase with uncertainty.
We focus on the case of an interior solution for the choice variable.
Then, the optimality condition with respect to I ensures that the
solution value satisﬁes:
dC I⁎
 
dI
þ pdC
C
B μ
C⁎
B ; I
⁎
 
dI
þ 1− p
2
dCLB μ
L⁎
B ; I
⁎
 
dI
¼ 0 ð15Þ
Themarginal costs of innovation equate themarginal beneﬁts from
reduced abatement costs in the central and low cost cases, weighted
by the probability of occurrence of both states.
Implicit differentiation with respect to p yields:
d2C I⁎
 
dI2
dI⁎
dp
þ pd
2CCB μ
C⁎
B ; I
⁎
 
dI2
dI⁎
dp
þ dC
C
B μ
C⁎
B ; I
⁎
 
dI
þ
þ1− p
2
d2CLB μ
L⁎
B ; I
⁎
 
dI2
dI⁎
dp
−
1
2
dCLB μ
L⁎
B ; I
⁎
 
dI
¼ 0
ð16Þ
Rearranging terms:
dI⁎
dp
d2C I⁎
 
dI2
þ pd
2CCB μ
C⁎
B ; I
⁎
 
dI2
þ 1− p
2
d2CLB μ
L⁎
B ; I
⁎
 
dI2
( )
¼ −dC
C
B μ
C⁎
B ; I
⁎
 
dI
þ 1
2
dCLB μ
L⁎
B ; I
⁎
 
dI
ð17Þ
It is reasonable to assume convex cost functions in I (i.e. increasing
marginal costs of innovation, and decreasing marginal beneﬁts of
innovation to abatement); the left hand side term of the expression is
then positive, and the sign of dI
⁎
dp
is determined by the sign of the right
hand side of the last equation.
The right hand side confronts the innovation marginal beneﬁts for
the central and low cost cases. From Eq. (2) we know that themarginal
beneﬁts in the low cost case are twice those of the central case.We can
rewrite the right end side of Eq. (17) as follows:
−
dCCB μ
C⁎
B ; I
⁎
 
dI
þ 1
2
dCLB μ
L⁎
B ; I
⁎
 
dI
¼ −dC
C
B μ
C⁎
B ; I
⁎
 
dI
þ dC
C
B μ
L⁎
B ; I
⁎
 
dI
¼MBC μC⁎B
 MBC μL⁎B ≶0?
ð18Þ
We have obtained that the sign of dI
⁎
dp
depends onwhether marginal
beneﬁts of R&D investments are increasing with abatement or not.
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Abstract
This paper investigates the potential contribution of forestry management in meeting a CO2 stabilization policy of 550 ppmv by 2100.
In order to assess the optimal response of the carbon market to forest sequestration, we couple two global models. An
energy–economy–climate model for the study of climate policies is linked with a detailed forestry model through an iterative procedure
to provide the optimal abatement strategy. Results show that forestry is a determinant abatement option and could lead to signiﬁcantly
lower policy costs if included. Linking forestry management to the carbon market has the potential to alleviate the policy burden of
50 ppmv or equivalently of 1
4
C, and to signiﬁcantly decrease the price of carbon. Biological sequestration will mostly come from avoided
deforestation in tropical-forest-rich countries. The inclusion of this mitigation option is demonstrated to crowd out some of the
traditional abatement in the energy sector and to lessen induced technological change in clean technologies.
r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Forestry; Climate policy; Technological innovation
1. Introduction
This study examines the role that forestry may play in
the context of atmospheric CO2 stabilization. There is
widespread research suggesting that biological sequestra-
tion of carbon can play an important role for reducing
greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions through activities such
as slowing the rate of deforestation, increasing the
establishment of forests on old agricultural or degraded
lands, and improving the management of existing and
future timber (see, for example, Metz et al., 2001).
Estimates of the range of potential costs of sequestration
are fairly wide (Richards and Stokes, 2004), but there is
also general consensus that forest sinks can be a valuable
mitigation option. However, the nations of the Kyoto
Protocol have thus far only haltingly incorporated forestry
measures, and the Kyoto process only recently (at the 11th
Conference of Parties in 2005) began considering how one
of the measures with the largest potential, tropical forest
conservation or prevention of deforestation (see, for this
purpose, the proposal as in Moutinho et al., 2005) could be
included.
There are several explanations for the limited role that
forestry has so far played in abatement strategies. First,
error bounds for measuring and monitoring carbon in
forests are fairly large in developed countries with well-
established measurement technologies (see Watson et al.,
2000). Errors in calculating carbon storage are likely to be
larger in developing countries that have devoted fewer
resources to conducting forest inventories. Second,
many concerns have been raised about issues such as
additionality and permanence. Unlike abatement of
energy emissions, carbon stored in forests is subject to
future emissions due to harvesting or other natural
disturbances. Third, it is widely assumed that allowing
forestry options would reduce incentives to develop
important abatement technologies, and these techno-
logies are ultimately necessary to achieve a stable, albeit
changed, climate. The ﬁrst two questions have been
widely addressed in a range of publications, including
those of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(see Watson et al., 2000; Metz et al., 2001). However, no
one has yet quantiﬁed the implications of a forest carbon
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sequestration program on the innovation of energy
abatement technologies.
Recent research indicates that global policies meant to
stabilize GHG concentrations in the future will require a
vast bundle of measures to meet ambitious targets (Pacala
and Socolow, 2004). Given the recent focus on stabilization
policies and the apparent costs of achieving fairly stringent
concentration targets, it is surprising that relatively few
energy models have even incorporated forestry sequestra-
tion (see Rose et al., 2006). Sohngen and Mendelsohn
(2003), do link a forestry model to an aggregate global
climate—economy model (DICE; Nordhaus and Boyer,
2000), and their results suggest that forestry could provide
nearly one-third of the world’s carbon abatement over the
coming century, but that study examined a fairly limited
overall carbon abatement strategy, and it suggested that a
large portion of the carbon sequestration in forests would
occur later in the century (thus having little impact on
energy abatement). With more stringent policies, carbon
prices initially are expected to be higher, and forestry
sequestration could have more important implications for
the costs of the overall abatement program.
This paper develops an intertemporal optimization
model of carbon abatement in the energy and land-using
sectors to analyze the potential role that forests may play in
climate stabilization policy. To accomplish this, we bring
together a forestry and an energy–economy–climate model
to evaluate the mitigation potential of forest sequestration
and to measure the deriving feedback on ‘‘traditional’’
abatement options and on the carbon market as a whole.
To put ourselves in a context of a global climate policy, we
consider a target of a 550 ppmv CO2 only stabilization
(see International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
(2001) for a scientiﬁc motivation of the target), and
examine the abatement pathway with and without forestry
sequestration.
Results show that forestry has important implications
for the overall abatement strategy, and a profound effect
on the carbon market (i.e., on the global costs of a climate
policy), so that, for example, 50 additional ppmv–equiva-
lently of 1
4
C—are achieved at no extra cost. The numerical
optimization estimates that forest sinks can contribute to
one-third of total abatement by 2050 and decrease the price
of carbon by 40% by 2050. This decisive reduction in the
policy costs is mainly attained via avoiding deforestation in
tropical forests in the ﬁrst half of the century, though it
could also be sustained in later periods by afforestation and
enhanced forest management. The introduction of the
forestry option is shown to have a visible inﬂuence on other
abatement alternatives: in meeting a given policy target,
forestry crowds out some abatement in the energy sector,
so that, for example, improvements of the energy intensity
of the economy are more modest in early periods. More
importantly, policy-induced technological change in clean
technologies such as renewables power generation is also
reduced. Although the time needed for technological
advancement may be considered as one reason to delay
permanent emissions cuts, buying time with forestry
appears to be an attractive mitigation option.
In order to produce results, the two world models are
coupled via an iterative procedure that focuses on carbon
quantities and prices. Various characteristics are at the basis
of the originality of the present paper. First, the model’s
dynamic speciﬁcation of the economy and the detail of the
energy sector allow us to assess the dynamic feedbacks on
the economic system as well as the evolution of energy
technologies. This enables us to integrate forest carbon sinks
into the control problem of GHG mitigation, so that
investments in ﬁnal good, energy technologies, energy R&D,
and forestry are optimally chosen. The energy sector
description and the presence of endogenous technological
change—a central feature for climate change modeling; see
Goulder and Mathai (2000)—puts us in the condition to
assess how the inclusion of forestry incentives may affect
induced technological change, an issue not yet investigated
to our knowledge. Moreover, the intertemporal structure of
the models is essential to understand the timing issue of the
biological sequestration abatement option, which is a largely
discussed one because of the non-permanence issue (man-
aged forests do not sequester carbon permanently but
release it back to the atmosphere if harvested).
Second, the regional disaggregation of both models
allows us to account for distributional issues among
countries (the so-called ‘‘where’’ dimension), an issue that
has proved particularly central in the policy debate
surrounding the forestry abatement option. Last but not
least, contrary to current studies, by framing the analysis in
a global mitigation policy context such as a 550 ppmv
target, we are able to augment the cost-effectiveness
literature introducing an additional measure designed to
cover a stabilization wedge.
With respect to the existing literature, the approach that
is the closest to ours is the one in Sohngen and Mendelsohn
(2003). Their original analysis is, however, limited to a
single world region and has incomplete technological
detail. Similar to van’t Veld and Plantinga (2005), they
ﬁnd forestry to have but a negligible feedback on the
carbon market. Also, they ﬁnd that forestry carbon offsets
do not delay energy abatement. Conversely, Gitz et al.
(2006) use a stochastic version of DIAM—a single region,
least abatement costs model. They ﬁnd, as in our case, a
signiﬁcant forestry–carbon market linkage.
This paper is divided as follows. Section 2 introduces
both models and deﬁnes the coupling procedure. Section 3
presents numerical results, and Section 4 concludes.
2. Models and coupling
In this section, we present the two models that have been
linked to analyze the role of forestry in contributing to the
climate stabilization target of 550 ppmv CO2 only. For the
energy–economy side we use the World Induced Technical
Change Hybrid model (WITCH) (Bosetti et al., 2006), a
recently designed hybrid integrated assessment model for
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climate change issues. As for the forestry part, we use a
global timber model built upon Sohngen et al. (1999).
2.1. The energy–economy–climate model
WITCH is a regional integrated assessment model
structured to provide normative information on the
optimal responses of world economies to climate damages
and to model the channels of transmission of climate policy
to the economic system. It is a hybrid model because it
combines features of both top-down and bottom-up
modeling: the top-down component consists of an inter-
temporal optimal growth model in which the energy input
of the aggregate production function has been expanded to
give a bottom-up-like description of the energy sector.
World countries are grouped in 12 regions that strategically
interact following a game-theoretic structure. A climate
module and a damage function provide the feedback on the
economy of carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere.
The WITCH top-down framework guarantees a coherent,
fully intertemporal allocation of investments that have an
impact on the level of mitigation—R&D effort, investment
in energy technologies, and fossil fuel expenditures. The
regional speciﬁcation of the model and the presence of
strategic interaction among regions—through CO2, ex-
haustible natural resources, and technological spillovers—
allow us to account for the incentives to free-ride. By
playing an open-loop Nash game, the investment strategies
are optimized by taking into account both economic and
environmental externalities. In WITCH, the energy sector
has been detailed and allows a reasonable characterization
of future energy and technological scenarios and an
assessment of their compatibility with the goal of stabiliz-
ing GHG concentrations. Also, by endogenously modeling
fuel (oil, coal, natural gas, uranium) prices, as well as the
cost of storing the CO2 captured, the model can be used to
evaluate the implication of mitigation policies on the
energy system in all its components. Finally, technical
change in WITCH is endogenous and is driven both by
learning-by-doing (LbD) and by energy R&D investments.
These two factors of technological improvements act
through two different channels: LbD is speciﬁc to the
power generation costs, while R&D affects the non-electric
sector and the overall system energy efﬁciency.
In this paper, we focus on a stabilization policy of
550 ppmv. In order to do so, we perform a cost-
effectiveness analysis with a cap and trade policy instru-
ment, and we set an equal per capita allocation system. We
have an emission permit trading scheme that equalizes
regional marginal abatement costs, creating a unique set of
carbon prices. The model is solved to 2200 numerically in
GAMS/CONOPT.
2.2. The forestry model
The forestry model is built upon the model described
in Sohngen et al. (1999) and used by Sohngen and
Mendelsohn (2003) to analyze global sequestration poten-
tial. The model used in this analysis contains an expanded
set of timber types, as described in Sohngen and
Mendelsohn (2006). There are 146 distinct timber types in
13 regions: each of the 146 timber types modeled can be
allocated into one of three general types of forest stocks.
First, moderately valued forests, managed in optimal
rotations, are located primarily in temperate regions.
Second, high-value timber plantations are managed inten-
sively. Subtropical plantations are grown in the southern
United States (loblolly pine plantations), South America,
southern Africa, the Iberian Peninsula, Indonesia, and
Oceania (Australia and New Zealand). Finally, low-valued
forests, managed lightly if at all, are located primarily in
inaccessible regions of the boreal and tropical forests.
The inaccessible forests are harvested only when timber
prices exceed marginal access costs. The forestry model
maximizes the net present value of net welfare in the
forestry sector.
One important component of the costs of producing
timber and carbon are land rental costs. The model
accounts for these costs by incorporating a series of land
rental functions for each timber type. The rental functions
account for land competition between forestry and
agriculture, although they are not presently responsive to
price changes in agriculture (see Sohngen and Mendelsohn
(2006) for additional discussion of the land rental
functions). Incentives for carbon sequestration are incor-
porated into the forestry model by renting carbon. The
price of energy abatement is the value of sequestering and
holding a ton of carbon permanently. The rental value for
holding a ton of carbon for a year is determined as the path
of current and future rental values on that ton that is
consistent with the price of energy abatement currently.
One of the beneﬁts of using the rental concept for carbon
sequestration is that the carbon temporarily stored can be
paid while it is stored, with no payments accruing when it is
no longer stored (i.e., if forest land is converted to
agriculture, or if timber is harvested, leaving the forest in
a temporarily low-carbon state). Furthermore, renting
carbon does not penalize current forestland owners by
charging them for emissions. We do, however, account for
long-term storage of carbon in wood products by paying
the price of carbon for tons when they are stored
permanently after harvest. For simplicity, in this analysis,
we assume that 30% of harvested wood is stored
permanently, following Winjum et al. (1998).
2.3. Coupling
Given the complexities of the two models used in this
paper, we have integrated them via an iterative procedure.
In order to do so, we have augmented both models so that
they could incorporate results from the other, and have run
subsequent iterations until convergence, as measured by a
sufﬁciently small rate of variation of carbon prices. We
deﬁne this as being less than a 5% average deviation in
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prices and quantities from one scenario to the next. As
expected, the initial high responses of both models—in
terms of adjustments of carbon prices to the quantities
sequestered in forests and vice versa—gradually shrink,
and an equilibrium is achieved after 11 iterations. For
prices, the average deviation is 3% whereas for quantities it
is 4%. This way of interfacing two separate models is
normally described as ‘‘soft link’’, and has been extensively
used to couple energy system models and economic models
to account for the mutual interactions between the energy
sector and the whole economy.
To make the two models consistent, several additional
adjustments were made. First, the different regions had to
be matched. Coincidentally, the regional disaggregation is
similar in the two cases—12 regions for the WITCH model,
13 for the forestry one—so that only minor adjustments
were needed. Also, the WITCH model has 5-year time
steps and the forestry model has 10-year time steps. To link
the two, we utilized prices at the 10-year intervals provided
by the WITCH model in the forestry model. We
interpolated carbon sequestration rates between 10-year
time increments from the forestry model when incorporat-
ing forest sequestration in the WITCH model. The forestry
model has been augmented to comprise the time path of
carbon prices, which is equalized across regions and given
by the emissions permits prices of the cap and trade policy.
To account for the non-permanence of the biological
sequestration, carbon prices are transformed into annual
storing values via rental rates. For more information, see
Sohngen and Mendelsohn (2003). The energy–economy–
climate model has been fed the carbon quantities seques-
tered by forests in each region by counting them in the
carbon emission balances, as well as in the budget
constraint—at the carbon price value.
3. Results
In this section, we report the numerical results of the
contribution of forestry management in meeting a CO2
(only) stabilization policy of 550 ppmv by 2100. To give the
feeling of what such a policy entails in terms of global
warming mitigation, in Fig. 1 we show the time proﬁle of
carbon emissions for a business as usual (BaU) and a
550 ppmv policy resulting from using the WITCH with
abatement only in the energy sector. In a no-policy
scenario, emissions grow to 20GtC by the end of the
century, whereas for the 550 ppmv policy, emissions peak
around 2050, falling by more than half after that with
respect to BaU. The 550 ppmv policy reduces the carbon
intensity in the economy considerably, and reduces the
increase in global temperature by 2100 to 2.2 1C, from
2.9 1C in the BaU. Although this temperature is still higher
than the IPCC advocated level of 2 1C, we concentrate on
this target given its relevance, especially in terms of
political feasibility.
We start by reporting the potential of forestry in
contributing to the foreseen emission reductions, and then
analyze the impacts on the carbon markets and the policy
costs. Finally, we examine the retroactions on the energy
abatement portfolio, with a particular look at the implica-
tions for induced technological change.
3.1. Sequestration in forests
Several studies in the forestry literature have estimated
the sequestration potential for various given carbon prices,
and most seem to agree that forestry can provide a
signiﬁcant share of abatement (Sedjo et al., 1995). As an
example, it is worth remembering that tropical deforesta-
tion is a major source of GHG emissions, accounting for as
much as 25% of global anthropogenic GHG emissions
(Houghton, 2005).
Fig. 2 reports carbon abatement over the century
accomplished by forestry in OECD and non-OECD
countries vis-a`-vis the overall abatement effort. The picture
underlines an important role for biological sequestration:
forests sequester around 75GtC cumulative to 2050.
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This estimate is consistent with the results presented in
earlier IPCC reports (see, for example, Watson et al., 2000)
but of course there are costs associated with this forestry
effort. Overall, forestry contributes to one-third of total
abatement to 2050, or three wedges in the words of Pacala
and Socolow (2004). After the peak in emissions in 2050,
the share of forestry in total abatement starts to decline
(from 2050 to 2100 it increases by only 10% in absolute
values), given that the target gets more stringent and
permanent emission cuts in the energy sector are called for.
The largest share of carbon sequestration occurs in non-
OECD countries during the early part of the century
(Table 1). Around 63% of all of the carbon sequestered
from 2002 to 2052 of the stabilization scenario results from
reductions in deforestation in just a few regions, namely
Latin America, East Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Most
of this carbon is due to reductions in deforestation. While
consideration of policies to reduce deforestation has been
shunned in earlier negotiations related to the Kyoto
Protocol, they recently received signiﬁcant attention as a
result of discussions at COP 11 in Montreal.
Focusing on Latin America, East Asia, and Sub-Saharan
Africa, where the bulk of deforestation currently is
occurring (FAO, 2005), around 10.7 million hectares of
forestland are estimated to be lost each year (Table 2). The
carbon incentives in the stabilization scenario would reduce
these losses to around 5.9 million hectares per year during
the ﬁrst decade, and they would essentially halt net forest
losses by 2022. While developing policies to reduce
deforestation efﬁciently would undoubtedly be a difﬁcult
task, these results suggest that the economic value of
making these changes could be substantial.
The overall size of the carbon program increases over the
century as carbon prices rise. It increases in both the
OECD and the non-OECD regions, but the largest
percentage gains occur in the OECD, where the annual
carbon sink rises from 118 to 479 million t C/yr. In most
non-OECD regions, the strength of the sink is actually
declining because there are no longer opportunities to
reduce deforestation, and forest growth on large areas of
land that were reforested during the century is starting to
slow. The one outlier is China, where sequestration
expands. Sequestration dynamics in China tend to be more
similar to OECD countries because it has large areas of
temperate forests that have long growing cycles.
By reducing deforestation and promoting afforestation,
a forest carbon sequestration program as part of a
stabilization strategy would have strong impacts on total
forestland area in the world, increasing it by 1.1 billion
hectares relative to the baseline, or around 0.7 billion
hectares above the current area of forests (Table 3). The
largest share of increased forest area occurs in non-OECD
countries. The stabilization scenario has complex results on
timber harvests and prices. Initially, timber is withheld
from the market in order to provide relatively rapid forest
carbon sequestration through aging timber. As a result,
global harvests decline by 14.5% relative to the baseline in
2022. However, over the century, more forests imply a
larger supply of timber. By 2092 timber harvests increase
by 26%. The changes in speciﬁc regions depend heavily on
the types of forests (e.g., the growth function), the carbon
in typical forests (e.g., biomass expansion factors), and
economic conditions such as prices and costs. In contrast
to the area changes, the largest increases in timber harvests
(in relative and total terms) occur in OECD countries.
OECD countries tend to have many species amenable to
producing wood products.
3.2. Optimal response of the carbon market
We now focus on the general equilibrium effects of
including forestry management as an abatement strategy.
As a comprehensive measure of the inﬂuence of biological
sequestration on the carbon market, we ﬁrst examine what
happens to the price of carbon when forestry is included
into the policy. Fig. 3 shows the carbon price for the
550 ppmv policy throughout the century as found in the
original version of the WITCH model (iter1), and after it
has been coupled with the forestry model (iter11). Forest
sinks substantially lower the cost of CO2, for example by
40% in 2050, making a 550 ppmv policy cost as much as a
600 pmmv policy without including forestry. That is,
carbon sinks achieve an additional 50 ppmv—or equiva-
lently 1
4
C—in 2100 at no extra cost.
To corroborate the idea that forestry can alleviate the
compliance to the 550 ppmv target, in Fig. 4 we show the
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Table 1
Regional forest carbon sequestration, 2025, 2055, 2095
2022 2052 2092
MtC/yr
OECD
USA 42 144 193
OLDEURO 37 82 132
NEWEURO 8 18 29
CAJANZ 31 115 125
Total OECD 118 360 479
Non-OECD
KOSAU 25 27 36
TE 179 117 134
MENA 73 49 31
SSA 270 175 106
SASIA 34 57 32
China 109 155 431
EASIA 451 481 371
LACA 391 326 330
Total non-OECD 1649 1746 1950
Total global 1766 2105 2429
C price $57 $113 $271
CAJANZ: Canada, Japan, and New Zealand. KOSAU: Korea, South
Africa, and Australia. TE: Transition Economies. MENA: Middle East
and North Africa. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. SASIA: India and South
Asia. EASIA: South East Asia. LACA: Latin America and Caribbean.
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policy costs with and without forestry. Again, forest sinks
are shown to decrease policy costs: in particular, the policy
burden is reduced and shifted ahead in the period to 2050,
when the main action is via avoided deforestation. After
2070 the policy-induced beneﬁts from avoided climate
damages outweigh the costs of reducing emissions, and this
effect is reinforced when forestry is an available mitigation
option. All in all, the world policy cost in net present value
decreases from 0.2% without forestry to 0.1% with
forestry. This corresponds to a net present value saving
to 2100 of almost $3.0 trillion (USD), which is nearly three
times the present value cost of adding the forestry program
of $1.1 trillion (USD).
One might wonder what are the distributional effects of
including forestry for different regions. Two competing
effects are at stake: on the one hand, forestry will beneﬁt
developing countries that are rich in tropical forests, given
the role of avoided deforestation. On the other hand, the
lower price of carbon will beneﬁt countries that buy carbon
market permits, and disadvantage sellers. Ultimately, the
distributional effects will depend on the emissions alloca-
tion scheme adopted in the policy. For example, if one
assumes that emissions are allocated based on an equal per
capita rule, as we do in this paper, most of the emissions
reductions are borne by the developed countries. Lower
carbon prices with forestry included in the stabilization
policy improve welfare in OECD countries by reducing
their costs (from an undiscounted loss of 0.6% without
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Table 2
Net land area change in regions currently undergoing substantial deforestation, in million hectares per year
Projected for
FAO (2000–2005) 2002–2012 2012–2022 2022–2032
Latin and Central America 4.7 2.3 0.9 0.2
East Asia 2.8 1.2 0.4 0.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.2 2.4 0.1 0.0
Total 10.7 5.9 1.4 0.1
Table 3
Change in forestland area and change in annual timber harvests compared
to the baseline
2022 2052 2092 2022 2052 2092
Million hectares % Change in annual harvest
OECD
USA 1.5 23.1 94.2 1.2 9.0 48.5
OLDEURO 11.5 34.9 51.9 5.3 12.1 0.3
NEWEURO 2.6 7.8 11.6 5.3 12.1 0.3
CAJANZ 4.0 24.5 99.0 3.8 3.3 167.3
Total OECD 11.6 90.3 256.7 3.3 3.0 54.1
Non-OECD
KOSAU 5.1 17.7 49.1 11.3 34.5 42.1
TE 19.0 52.2 102.7 20.8 8.9 26.1
MENA 10.3 24.9 38.4 63.9 45.9 6.7
SSA 37.2 90.7 137.0 70.1 52.9 9.0
SASIA 5.2 18.8 32.3 3.7 3.9 13.0
China 8.6 41.9 115.4 20.1 0.0 98.8
EASIA 25.6 66.0 111.9 63.3 57.2 48.9
LACA 42.9 129.3 262.4 24.8 7.1 15.5
Total non-OECD 153.8 441.5 849.2 31.9% 15.4% 14.9%
Total 165.4 531.8 1105.9 14.5% 3.3% 25.9%
CAJANZ: Canada, Japan, and New Zealand. KOSAU: Korea, South
Africa, and Australia. TE: Transition Economies. MENA: Middle East
and North Africa. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. SASIA: India and South
Asia. EASIA: South East Asia. LACA: Latin America and Caribbean.
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forestry to 0.2% with forestry). On the contrary, non-
OECD countries tend to be carbon permit sellers, and they
have lower revenues when forestry is included as an option,
although the difference in revenues is fairly small (from an
undiscounted gain of 0.38% without forestry to 0.27%
with forestry). It is worth noting that a different allowances
allocation scheme would have changed the distributional
results, though it would not have any impact on the carbon
prices as they are determined by the world marginal
abatement costs.
3.3. Implications for energy abatement and technological
change
An issue that has played a political relevance in the
decision to keep forestry outside the Kyoto Protocol is
the danger that the emissions constraint on the energy
system might be relaxed too much: the deployment of
clean technologies that can reduce emissions permanently
might be delayed, and accordingly the investments in
innovation that are needed to make new technologies
competitive. Given the low turnover of energy capital
stock, as well as the lengthy process before commercializa-
tion of advanced technologies, this is a justiﬁed reason of
concern. The energy sector description and the endogenous
technological change feature of the WITCH model allow
us to check for the variations in energy abatement due to
forestry.
In Fig. 5 we show the evolution of the world primary
energy intensity, an aggregate indicator that summarizes
the energy efﬁciency of the economy. Results are presented
for the BaU scenario, and the 550 ppmv policy with and
without forestry. As expected, the climate target induces
more reductions in energy intensity with respect to the BaU
scenario. However, this reduction is more moderate when
we include the forestry abatement option: the energy
intensity remains close to the BaU in the ﬁrst 2–3 decades
of this century, when avoided deforestation is signiﬁcantly
contributing to abatement, and then approaches the no-
forestry path, as the emissions cuts in the energy sector
become more predominant. We thus provide evidence of a
delay in energy abatement, though limited to the very ﬁrst
part of the century. For example, the initial deployment of
coal power plants with carbon capture and storage is
postponed from 2015 (without forestry) to 2030 (with
forestry). Similarly, the share of nuclear power is lower
with forestry. Such a setback of low-carbon technologies
can be seen either as harmful for the global warming
cause or optimistically as a bridge solution in the wait to
develop more consolidated, yet currently uneconomical,
technologies.
We can try to answer this question by looking at what
happens to the policy-induced technological change in the
model. As mentioned in Section 2.2, WITCH features
endogenous technological change via both LbD and energy
R&D. In Fig. 6 we show the forestry inclusion implications
for LbD: we plot the percentage variations in the
investment costs of wind and solar power plants with
respect to the BaU case, either with or without forestry.
Forest sinks hamper the capacity of the 550 ppmv policy to
induce technological change, as testiﬁed by the lower
decrease in renewable costs due to the lower capacity
deployment. Also, energy R&D investments are decreased
by forestry, by roughly 10% (not shown). Although these
are not vast variations in absolute ﬁgures, technological
innovation could play a crucial role in hedging against
possible future revisions of the climate targets, for example
in case more pessimistic evidence about global warming
emerges. Inevitably, in meeting given emission caps
forestry crowds out other abatement; accompanying
technological policies might be desirable to ensure a
contemporaneous emergence of innovative technologies.
4. Conclusions
This paper evaluates the potential of forest sequestration
within the context of stabilizing future concentrations of
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atmospheric carbon at 550 ppmv CO2, and it assesses the
feedback of forest sequestration on ‘‘traditional’’ energy
abatement options. Although numerous studies have
estimated the mitigation contribution of forest sinks,
understanding how forest sequestration integrates with
other climate change options has received little attention.
Contemporaneous determination of carbon prices and
sequestration in forests, and on the general equilibrium
consequences, is thus a largely unexplored area of research.
The current paper is a signiﬁcant contribution as it
provides insights of the effects of including forest manage-
ment on the optimal carbon market responses, the
energy technology evolution, and induced technological
change.
Results show that forestry is an important abatement
option, and that its inclusion into an international policy
agreement can have a profound effect on the global costs of
a climate policy, allowing a free saving of 50 ppmv in 2100,
corresponding to 1
4
C. In particular, we ﬁnd that the total
costs of the forestry program are $1.1 trillion (USD) and
the beneﬁts, in terms of additional gross world product
relative to meeting the same carbon constraint without
forestry, are $3.0 trillion (USD). Forest sequestration
actions in the ﬁrst half of the century, mainly from
avoiding deforestation, could contribute one-third of total
abatement effort, and could provide additional beneﬁts
throughout the entire century. Forest sinks have the
potential to reduce the price of traded carbon permits,
and the overall cost of the policy in terms of income losses,
by half. However, in meeting the emissions reductions
target, forestry crowds out some of the abatement in the
energy sector for the ﬁrst 2–3 decades. For example,
deployment a potentially relevant energy abatement
technology such as carbon capture and storage is delayed
by 15 years. Policy-induced technological change in clean
technologies such as renewables power generation is also
reduced. Policy makers should consider developing tar-
geted policies to help achieve the technological advance-
ment to hedge against unknown risks, but they can make
substantial headway towards achieving climate stabiliza-
tion now with forest carbon sequestration.
These results provide a ﬁrst step towards fuller
consideration of land-based carbon sequestration in energy
models. Future work should consider several improve-
ments over this analysis. First, for example, future analysis
should more carefully consider competition with agricul-
ture and other land uses. Sequestration or abatement in the
agricultural sector could provide important competing
options for meeting stabilization targets, and thus are
important to consider as well. Second, the endogenous
effects of an increase in global temperature on the capacity
of forests to sequester carbon can provide a more complete
assessment of the problem. Third, biomass energy provides
an additional competing land use that could have implica-
tions for these results.
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Appendix. The WITCH model 
This section contains an overview of the WITCH model. For a complete description the reader is 
referred to Bosetti, Massetti and Tavoni (2006), and subsequent papers, that can be freely 
downloaded from the model website www.feem-web.it/witch. 
 
Overview 
WITCH is a regional integrated assessment model designed to identify the best responses of world 
economies to climate damages and to model the channels of transmission of climate policy into the 
economic system. The model has been used extensively for the analysis of the economics of 
climate change policies. 
Several features distinguish the model. First, WITCH is based on a top-down framework that 
guarantees a coherent, forward-looking, fully intertemporal allocation of investments in physical 
capital and in R&D. Second, the model accounts for most actions that have an impact on the level 
of GHG mitigation – e.g. R&D expenditures, investment in carbon-free technologies, purchases of 
emissions permits or expenditure for carbon taxes – and can thus be used to evaluate optimal 
economic and technological responses to different policy measures. Third, the regional 
specification of the model and the presence of strategic interaction among regions – as for example 
through learning spillovers in wind & solar technologies, R&D spillovers or climate damages – 
allows us to account for the incentives to free-ride in the choice of optimal investments. This 
allows to inform policy makers on the optimal policy portfolio that is needed to overcome the 
various market failures (e.g. both environmental and innovation ones). Finally, technological 
change is modeled both via innovation and diffusion processes, so that policy induced 
technological advancements are evaluated.  
A key feature of WITCH is that it explicitly models the interdependency of all countries’ climate, 
energy and technology policies. The investment strategies are thus optimized by taking into 
account both economic and environmental externalities (e.g. CO2, exhaustible resources, 
international R&D spillovers, etc). The investment profile for each technology is the solution of an 
intertemporal game among the 12 regions. More specifically, these 12 regions behave strategically 
with respect to all decision variables by playing an open-loop game that provides the Nash 
equilibrium. The equilibrium is open loop because a region optimizes its welfare function by 
determining the value of its decision variables from period 1 to period T. There is no feedback 
from future states of the world. The equilibrium is a fixed point and therefore a Nash equilibrium. 
From a top-down perspective, this enables us to analyze both the geographical dimension (e.g. rich 
vs. poor regions) and the time dimension (e.g. present vs. future generations) of climate policy. 
Model Structure 
WITCH is a Ramsey-type neoclassical optimal growth hybrid model defined for 12 macro 
regions of the world, as shown in Figure 1. For each of these regions a central planner chooses the 
optimal time paths of the control variables – investments in different capital stocks, in R&D, in 
energy technologies and consumption of fossil fuels – so as to maximize welfare, defined as the 
regional present value of log per capita consumption. Output is produced by aggregating factors via 
nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) functions as shown in Figure 2. Elasticity of 
substitution values are also reported. In particular, gross output of region n at time t is obtained by 
combining a Cobb-Douglas bundle of capital accumulated for final good production KC and labour 
L with energy services ES. Net output is obtained by accounting for the climate feedback Ω on 
production, and by subtracting expenditure for natural resources and carbon capture and 
sequestration (CCS) as shown in equation (1): 
 ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )tnCCStnP
tnXtPtnXtnP
tn
tnESntnLtnKntnTFP
tnY
CCS
f netimpffextrff
nn
C
,,
,,,
,
,))(1(,,)(,
,
,
int
,
/1
)()(1
−
+−
Ω




⋅−+⋅
=
∑
−
ρ
ρρββ αα
 1) 
TFP represents total factor productivity which evolves exogenously over time. Expenditure on fuels 
– indexed by f – enter either as extraction costs, extrfX , , or as net imports, impfX , . In particular if a 
country is a net oil exporter, this latter variable is negative and measures revenues from fuels 
exports. The cost of transporting and storing the captured CO2 is endogenous and depends on the 
quantity captured and injected in each region. 
Consumption of the single final good C is obtained via the economy budget constraint: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∑ ∑∑ −−−−= j j jjj jDRC tnO&MtnItnItnItnYtnC ,,,,,, ,&  (2) 
i.e., from output Y we subtract investment in final good IC , in energy R&Ds and in each energy 
technology – labelled by j
 
– as well as expenditure for Operation and Maintenance, denoted with 
O&M. 
The use of fossil fuels generates CO2 emissions, which are computed by applying 
stoichiometric coefficients to energy use. The quantity of carbon captured with carbon-capture and 
sequestration (CCS) technologies is subtracted from the carbon balance. Emissions are fed into a 
stylized three-box climate module (the dynamics of this module is described in Nordhaus and 
Boyer, 2000) which yields the magnitude of temperature increases relative to pre-industrial levels. 
The increase in temperature creates a wedge between gross and net output of climate change effects 
through the region-specific quadratic damage function Ω. 
Non-cooperative Solution 
In WITCH policy decisions adopted in one region of the world affect what goes on in all the 
other regions. This implies that the equilibrium of the model, i.e. the optimal inter-temporal 
investment profiles, R&D strategies and direct consumption of natural resources, must be computed 
by solving a dynamic game. World regions interact through five channels. 
First, at each time period, the prices of oil, coal, gas and uranium depend on the consumption 
in all regions of the world. Thus, investment decisions, consumption choices and R&D investment 
in any country at any time period indirectly affect all other countries’ choices. Consider, for 
example, the impact of a massive reduction of oil consumption in the USA and in Europe alone, 
possibly stimulated by policies that promote the deployment of biofuels. The resulting lower oil 
prices would modify energy demand in the rest of the world, probably stimulating higher emissions 
that would reduce the innovative actions of first movers. We thus describe rebound effects not only 
inside a region but also across regions. Second, at any time period, CO2 emissions from each region 
change the average world temperature and this affects the shadow value of carbon emissions in all 
other regions. Third, investment decisions in each electricity generation technology in each country 
at each time, affect other regions by changing the cumulative world installed capacity which in 
turns affects investment costs via Learning-by-Doing. The fourth channel of interaction derives 
from the international R&D spillovers that affect the costs of advanced biofuels. Finally, the fifth 
channel is at work if the model is used to analyze the effects of emissions trading. With an active 
emission permits market, regions interact via this channel. Marginal abatement costs are equalized 
across regions, with all the obvious consequences for R&D efforts and investment choices. 
WITCH incorporates these channels of interaction to characterize the interdependency of all 
countries’ climate, energy and technology policies. We model the interactions among world regions 
as a non-cooperative Nash game, which is solved recursively and yields an Open Loop Nash 
Equilibrium. The solution algorithm works as follows. At each new iteration, the social planner in 
every region takes the behaviour of other players produced by the previous iteration as given and 
sets the optimal value of all choice variables; this newly computed level of variables is stored and 
then fed to the next round of optimizations. The process is iterated until each region’s behaviour 
converges in the sense that each region’s choice is the best response to all other regions’ best 
responses to its behaviour. Convergence is rather fast (around fifty iterations) and the uniqueness of 
the solution has been tested using alternative starting conditions. The way in which the algorithm is 
constructed makes the solution invariant to different orderings of the regions. 
Energy Sector 
Figure 2 provides a diagrammatic description of the structure of the energy sector in WITCH 
and identifies the main technologies for the production of electric and non electric energy.  
Energy services ES, an input of (1), combines energy with a variable, HE, that represents 
technological advances stemming from investment in energy R&D for improvements in energy 
efficiency. As in Popp (2004), an increase in energy R&D efforts improves the efficiency with 
which energy, EN, is translated into energy services, ES (e.g. more efficient car engines, trains, 
technical equipment or light bulbs). 
EN is an aggregate of electric, EL, and non-electric energy, NEL. Contrary to what is specified 
in other top-down growth models – such as DEMETER (Gerlagh and van der Zwaan, 2004) and 
MIND (Edenhofer et al. 2005) – in WITCH energy demand is not exclusively defined by electricity 
consumption. We believe this is an important distinction as reducing emissions is traditionally more 
challenging in the non-electric sector, and its neglect would seriously over-estimate the potential 
GHG control achievements.  
Non-electric energy is obtained by linearly adding coal and traditional biomass and an 
oil-gas-biofuels (OGB) aggregate. The use of coal in non-electric energy production (COALnel) is 
quite small and limited to a few world regions, and is thus assumed to decrease exogenously over 
time in the same fashion as traditional biomass (TradBiom). The oil-gas-biofuels aggregate 
combines oil (OILnel), biofuels (Biofuels) and natural gas (GASnel) sources. In WITCH, ethanol is 
produced from sugar cane, wheat or corn (Trad Biofuel), or from cellulosic rich biomass (Advanced 
Biofuel).1 The two different qualities of ethanol add up linearly so that only the cheaper one is used. 
As for the use of energy for electricity production, nuclear power (ELNUKE) and renewable 
sources in the form of wind turbines and photovoltaic panels (ELW&S) are combined with fossil 
fuel-based electricity (ELFF), the output of thermoelectric plants using coal, oil and natural gas 
(ELCOAL, ELOIL and ELGAS). In this way, we are able to distinguish more interchangeable power 
generation technologies, such as the fossil-fuelled ones, from the others. Coal-based electricity is 
obtained by the linear aggregation of traditional pulverized coal technologies (ELPC) and integrated 
gasification combined cycle production with CCS (ELIGCC). Hydroelectric power (ELHYDRO) is 
added to the total electric composite; because of its constrained deployment due to limited site 
availability, we assume that it evolves exogenously, in accordance with full resource exploitation. 
One might note that by using a CES function we aggregate the various forms of energy in a 
non-linear way. This kind of aggregation is commonly used in economic models, to represent a less 
than infinite substitutability among factors: moving away from an established energy mix costs 
                                                 
1
 Cellulosic feedstock comprises agricultural wastes (wheat straw, corn stover, rice straw and bagasse), forest residue 
(underutilized wood and logging residues, dead wood, excess saplings and small trees), energy crops (fast growing 
trees, shrubs, grasses such hybrid poplars, willows and switchgrass). For a description of the cellulosic ethanol 
production see IEA (2004b). 
more than it would in a least cost minimization framework. This is also in agreement with 
econometric studies on inter-fuel substitution, which find little connection between energy 
consumption and own and cross energy prices. CES function bundling allows for contemporaneous 
investments in different technologies which conform to base-year calibrated factor shares and 
chosen elasticity of substitution, in contrast to linear aggregation where exogenous constraints on 
single (or a combination of) technologies are needed to return a portfolio of several investments. 
Finally, one should keep in mind that in economic models such as WITCH energy itself is an 
intermediate input, an aggregation of factors of production (capital, resources etc). 
For each technology j (wind and solar, hydroelectric, nuclear, traditional coal, integrated 
gasification combined cycle (IGCC) with CCS, oil and gas) at time t and in each region n, 
electricity is obtained by combining three factors in fixed proportions: (i) the installed power 
generation capacity (K) measured in power capacity units, (ii) operation and maintenance 
equipment (O&M) in final good units and (iii) fuel resource consumption (X) expressed in energy 
units, where appropriate. The resulting Leontief technology is as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }tnXtnO&MntnKntnEL ELjjjjjjj ,;,;,min, ,ςτµ=  (3) 
 
The parameters governing the production function take into account the technical features of each 
power production technology. Thus µ  translates power capacity into electricity generation (i.e. 
from TW to TWh) through a plant utilization rate (hours per year) which allows us to take into 
consideration the fact that some technologies - noticeably new renewables such as wind and solar 
power - are penalized by comparatively lower utilization factors; τ differentiates operation and 
maintenance costs among technologies, i.e. nuclear power is more expensive to run and maintain 
than a natural gas combined cycle (NGCC); finally, ς  measures (the reciprocal of) power plant fuel 
efficiencies and yields the quantity of fuels needed to produce a KWh of electricity. ELHYDRO and 
ELW&S are assumed to have efficiency equal to one, as they do not consume any fuel: the 
production process thus reduces to a two-factor Leontief production function. 
It is important to stress the fact that power generation capacity is not equivalent to cumulated 
investment in that specific technology, as different plants have different investment costs in terms 
of final output. That is: 
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where δj is the rate of depreciation and SCj is the final good cost of installing power generation 
capacity of type j, which is time and region-specific. It is worth noting that depreciation rates δj are 
set consistently with the power plants’ lifetime, so that again we are able to take into account the 
technical specifications of each different electricity production technology. 
In WITCH the cost of electricity generation is endogenously determined. WITCH calculates 
the cost of electricity generation as the sum of the cost of capital invested in plants and the 
expenditures for O&M and fuels. Since the cost of capital is equal to its marginal product, as capital 
is accumulated capital-intensive electricity generation technologies, such as nuclear or wind and 
solar, become more and more preferable to variable cost-intensive ones such as gas. Indeed, 
whereas at the beginning of the optimization period regions with high interest rates – such as the 
developing ones – disfavour capital-intensive power generation technologies, in the long run the 
model tends to prefer capital-intensive to fuel-intensive electricity production. Note that this feature 
is not shared by energy system models, as they are not able to ensure capital market equilibrium 
(see Bauer, 2005). Since investment costs, O&M costs, fuel efficiency for each technology and fuel 
prices are region-specific, we obtain a high degree of realism in constructing relative prices of 
different ways of producing electricity in the 12 regions considered.2 
Exhaustible Resources  
Four non renewable fuels are considered in the model – coal, crude oil, natural gas and 
uranium - whose cost follows a long-term trend that reflects their exhaustibility. We abstract from 
short-term fluctuations and model the time path of the resource f price starting from a reduced-form 
cost function that allows for non-linearity in the ratio of cumulative extraction to available 
resources.3 Initial resource stocks are region specific and so are extraction cost curves. Thus, for 
each fuel f  we have: 
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where c is the regional cost of resource f, depending on current extraction qf as well as on 
cumulative extraction Qf and on a region-specific markup, ( )nfχ ; fQ is the amount of total 
resources at time t and ( )nfpi  measures the relative importance of the depletion effect. Assuming 
competitive markets, the domestic price ( )tnPf ,  is equal to the marginal cost: 
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The second expression represents cumulative extraction and ( )tnX extrf ,,  is the amount of fuel f 
extracted in region n at time t. Fuels are traded among regions at an international market clearing 
price ( )tPfint . Each region can thus opt for autarky or trade in the market, either as a net buyer or a 
net seller of fuels. The net import of fuels ( )tnX netimpf ,,  takes on positive values when the region 
trades as a net buyer, and negative values when it trades as a net seller. 
CO2 Emissions 
Since WITCH offers the possibility of tracking the consumption of fossil fuels, GHGs 
emissions that originate from their combustion are derived by applying the corresponding 
stoichiometric coefficients to total consumption. Even though we presently use a climate module 
that responds only to CO2 emissions, a multi-gas climate module can easily be incorporated in 
WITCH thus allowing the introduction of gas-specific emissions ceilings.4 For each region n, CO2 
emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels are derived as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )tnCCStnXtnCO f fCOf ,,, 2,2 −= ∑ ω  (7) 
                                                 
2
 To our knowledge, the endogenous determination of electricity prices is a novelty in optimal growth integrated 
assessment models. 
3
 Hansen, Epple and Roberds (1985) use a similar cost function that allows for non-linearity also in the rate of 
extraction. 
4
 As in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) we take into account GHGs emissions other than CO2 by including an exogenous 
radiative forcing when computing temperature deviations from pre-industrial levels. Thus, when we simulate GHG 
stabilization policies we consider this additional component and accordingly constrain CO2 emissions to a global target. 
 where 
2,COfω  is the stoichiometric coefficient for CO2 emissions of fuel f and CCS stands for the 
amount of CO2 captured and sequestered while producing electricity in the coal IGCC power plant. 
The stoichiometric coefficient is assumed to be positive for traditional biofuels and negative for 
advanced biofuels, in line with IEA (2004b). As noted above, when analyzing climate policy, 
regions and/or countries may be allowed to trade their emissions allowances in a global or regional 
carbon market. 
Finally, WITCH’s climate module delivers emissions from land use change that are added to 
emissions from combustion of fossil fuels to determine atmospheric concentrations as in Nordhaus 
and Boyer (2000). 
 
Endogenous Technical Change (ETC) 
In standard version of WITCH, technical change is endogenous and is driven both by 
Learning-by-Doing (LbD) effects and by energy R&D investments (LbR). These two sources of 
technological improvements act through two different channels: LbD is specific to the power 
generation industry, while R&D affects the overall system energy efficiency. 
We incorporate the effect of technology diffusion using experience curves, that reproduce the 
observed empirical relation according to which the investment cost of a given technology decreases 
with the accumulation of installed capacity. Specifically, the cumulative installed world capacity is 
used as a proxy for the accrual of knowledge that affects the investment cost of a given technology: 
( ) ( )∑ −⋅=+ n PRtnKAtSC 2log,1  [ 8] 
here PR is the progress ratio that defines the speed of learning, K  is the cumulative installed 
capacity for region n at time t. With every doubling of cumulative capacity the ratio of the new 
investment cost to its original value is constant and equal to PR. With several electricity production 
technologies, the model is flexible enough to change the power production mix and invest in the 
more appropriate technology for each given policy measure, thus creating the conditions to foster 
the LbD effects associated with the clean but yet too pricey electricity production techniques. It 
should be noted that we assume complete spillovers of experience across countries, thus modeling 
the innovation market failure of non-appropriability of learning processes.  
As for LbR, we model endogenous technical change through investments in energy R&D that 
increase energy efficiency. Following Popp (2004), technological advances are captured by a stock 
of knowledge combined with energy in a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function, thus 
stimulating energy efficiency improvements: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ρρρ αα /1),(),(, tnENntnHEntnES ENH +=  [ 9] 
The stock of knowledge ),( tnHE derives from energy R&D investments in each region through an 
innovation possibility frontier characterized by diminishing returns to research, a formulation 
proposed by Jones (1995) and empirically supported by Popp (2002) for energy-efficient 
innovations in the US: 
)1)(,(),(),(1, && DRcbDR tnHEtnHEtn aI) tHE(n δ−+=+  [ 10] 
with DR&δ  being the depreciation rate of knowledge. As social returns from R&D are found to be 
higher than private ones in the case of energy R&D, the positive externality of knowledge creation 
is accounted for by assuming that the return on energy R&D investment is four times higher than 
the one on physical capital. At the same time, the opportunity cost of crowding out other forms of 
R&D is obtained by subtracting four dollars of private investment from the physical capital stock 
for each dollar of R&D crowded out by energy R&D, DR&ψ , so that the net capital stock for final 
good production becomes: 
)tnIt) – (n(Itn K) t(nK DRDRCCCC ),(4,)1)(,(1, &&ψδ +−=+  [ 11] 
where Cδ  is the depreciation rate of the physical capital stock. We assume new energy R&D 
crowds out 50% of other R&D, as in Popp (2004). This way of capturing innovation market failures 
was also suggested by Nordhaus (2003). 
Breakthrough technologies 
We introduce backstop technologies in both the electric and non electric sectors. Backstop 
technology can be better thought of as a compact representation of a portfolio of advanced 
technologies, that would ease the mitigation burden away from currently commercial options, 
though it would become available not before a few decades and only provided sufficient R&D 
investments are undertaken. This representation has the advantage of maintaining simplicity in the 
model by limiting the array of future energy technologies and thus the dimensionality of techno-
economic parameters for which reliable estimates and meaningful modeling characterization exist. 
We therefore model the backstop as “cumulative”, using historical and current expenditures and 
installed capacity for technologies which are already researched but are not yet viable (e.g. fuel 
cells, advanced biofuels, advanced nuclear technologies,…), without specifying the type of 
technology that will enter into the market. 
We follow the most recent characterization in the literature, modelling the costs of the backstop 
technologies with a two-factor learning curve in which the price of the technologies declines both 
with investments in dedicated R&D and with technology diffusion (see, e.g., Kouvaritakis, Soria et 
al., 2000). This improved formulation is meant to overcome the main criticism of the single factor 
experience curves (Nemet, 2006) by providing a more structural -R&D investment led- approach to 
the penetration of new technologies, and thus to ultimately better inform policy makers on the 
innovation needs in the energy sector. Modeling of long term and uncertain phenomena such as 
technological evolution calls for caution in the interpretation of exact quantitative figures, and to 
accurate sensitivity analysis. The model parsimony allows for tractable sensitivity studies. One 
should nonetheless keep in mind that economic implication of climate policies as well as carbon 
price signals are influenced by innovative technologies availability only after 2030. 
More specifically, we model the investment cost in a technology tec  as being influenced by a 
learning by researching process (main driving force before adoption) and by learning by doing 
(main driving force after adoption). ttecP , , the unit cost of technology tec at time t is a function of 
deployment, ttecCC ,  and dedicated R&D stock, ttecDR ,&  as described in equation 14: 
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where the R&D stock accumulates with the perpetual rule and CC is the cumulative installed 
capacity (or consumption) of the technology. 
We assume a two-period time interval (i.e. 10 yrs) between R&D knowledge investments have an 
effect on the price of the backstop technologies. This is to account for time lags between research 
and commercialization. 
The two exponents are the learning by doing index ( b− ) and the learning by researching index 
( c− ). They define the speed of learning and are derived from the learning ratios. The learning ratio 
lr  is the rate at which the generating cost declines each time the cumulative capacity doubles, while 
lrs  is the rate at which the cost declines each time the knowledge stock doubles. The relation 
between lrcb ,,  and lrs  can be expressed as follows: 
blr −=− 21  and clrs −=− 21  [ 13] 
We set the initial prices of the backstop technologies at roughly 10 times the 2002 price of 
commercial equivalents. The cumulative deployment of the technology is initiated at 1000 TWh and 
1 EJ respectively, an arbitrarily low value (Kypreos, 2007). The backstop technologies are assumed 
to be renewable in the sense that the fuel cost component is negligible; they are assumed to operate 
at load factors comparable with those of baseload power generation technologies. 
This formulation has received significant attention from the empirical and modelling literature in 
the most recent past (see, for instance, Criqui, Klassen et al., 2000; Barreto and Kypreos, 2004; 
Klassen, Miketa et al., 2005; Kypreos, 2007; Jamasab, 2007; Söderholm and Klassen, 2007), but 
estimates of parameters controlling the learning processes vary significantly across studies. In this 
formulation, we take averages of the values in the literature, as reported in Errore. L'origine 
riferimento non è stata trovata. Note that the value chosen for LbD parameter is lower than those 
normally estimated in single factor experience curves, since part of the technology advancement is 
now led by specific investments. This more conservative approach reduces the role of black box 
autonomous learning, which has been criticized for being too optimistic and leading to excessively 
low costs of transition towards low carbon economies. 
Table 1: Learning ratios for diffusion (LbD) and innovation (LbS) processes 
 
Technology Author Lbd LbS 
Criqui et al 2000 16% 7% 
Jamasab 2007 13% 26% 
Soderholm and 
Klassens 2007 
3.1% 13.2% 
Wind 
Klassens et al 
2005 
 12.6% 
PV Criqui et al 2000 20% 10% 
Solar Thermal Jamasab 2007 2.2% 5.3% 
Nuclear Power 
(LWR) 
Jamasab 2007 37% 24% 
CCGT (1980-89) Jamasab 2007 0.7% 18% 
CCGT (1990-98) Jamasab 2007 2.2% 2.4% 
Backstop EL  10% 13% 
Backstop NEL  7% 13% 
 
Backstops substitute linearly nuclear power in the electric sector, and oil in the non-electric one. We 
assume that once the backstop technologies become competitive thanks to dedicated R&D 
investment and pilot deployments, their uptake will not be immediate and complete, but rather there 
will be a transition/adjustment period. These penetration limits are a reflection of inertia in the 
system, as presumably the large deployment of backstops will require investment in infrastructures 
and the re-organization of the economic system. The upper limit on penetration is set equivalent to 
5% of the total consumption in the previous period by technologies other than the backstop, plus the 
electricity produced by the backstop in the electricity sector, and 7% in the non electricity sector.  
Spillovers in knowledge and experience 
The effect of international spillovers is deemed to be very important, and its inclusion in integrated 
assessment models desirable, since it would allow for a better representation of the innovation 
market failures and for specific policy exercises.  
In addition to spillovers of experience, WITCH includes spillovers in knowledge for energy 
efficiency improvements (Bosetti et al, 2007). 
The amount of spillovers entering each world region depends on a pool of freely available 
knowledge and on the ability of each country to benefit from it, i.e. on its absorption capacity and 
knowledge accumulates according to the standard capital accumulation perpetual rule. Knowledge 
acquired from abroad combines with domestic knowledge stock and investments and thus 
contributes to the production of new technologies at home.  
More specifically, we assume that a technological frontier is determined by the combined efforts in 
energy efficiency R&D of the group of high income countries. By assuming a technological frontier 
determined by more than one country, we avoid the case of one single world leader, which cannot 
absorb any valuable knowledge from its followers, which is highly unrealistic when not dealing 
with a specific industry. Furthermore, we assume that only a fraction of the knowledge pool can be 
absorbed by each country. The spillover of international knowledge in region n  at time t  is given 
by equation 14: 
( )[ ]),(),(*),(),(),( tnHEtnHEtnHEtnHEtnSPILL HIn
HIn
−= ∑
∑ ∈∈
 
[ 14] 
Where the second term represents the technological frontier, determined by the combined efforts in 
energy efficiency R&D of the group of high income countries, HI ; and the first term represents 
regional absorption capacity, a function of the distance of EE R&D capital accumulated in each 
region from the technological frontier. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: World Regions in the WITCH Model 
 
 
Regions: 
1) CAJANZ (Canada, Japan, New Zealand) 
2) USA 
3) LACA (Latin America, Mexico and Caribbean) 
4) OLDEURO (Old Europe) 
5) NEWEURO (New Europe) 
6) MENA (Middle East and North Africa) 
7) SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa excl. South Africa) 
8) TE (Transition Economies) 
9) SASIA (South Asia) 
10) CHINA (including Taiwan) 
11) EASIA (South East Asia) 
12) KOSAU (Korea, South Africa, Australia) 
 Figure 2: Production Nest and the Elasticity of Substitution values 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legenda: 
KL= capital-labour aggregate 
K = capital invested in the production of final good 
L = Labour 
ES = Energy services 
HE = Energy R&D capital 
EN = Energy 
EL = Electric energy 
NEL = Non-electric energy 
OGB = Oil, Gas and Biofuel nest 
ELFF = Fossil fuel electricity nest 
W&S= Wind and Solar 
ELj = Electricity generated with technology j  
TradBiom= Traditional Biomass 
Kj = Capital for generation of electricity with technology j 
O&Mj = Operation and Maintenance costs for generation of electricity with technology j 
‘FUELj’el = Fuel use for generation of electricity with technology j 
‘FUELj’nel = Direct fuel use in the non-electric energy use 
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